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Dialectical Regulation
ROBERT B. AHDIEH*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the emergence of the New Deal state, through the rise of civil
rights and risk regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, to the present day, the
mass of public regulation-and the number of regulators charged with its
design and implementation-has grown explosively over the 20th century.'
With this growth has come a concomitant increase in the engagement of
regulatory institutions across jurisdictional lines. Independent regulatory
authorities-federal and state environmental agencies, U.S. and foreign
banking regulators, and tribunals convened under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mississippi state law, among other
examples-today engage one another in pursuit of their respective
mandates. In the face of advances in communication technologies, the
increased ease and decreased cost of long-distance travel, and the expanded
and extended scope of economic and industrial activity, regulators today
face the undeniable reality of a small, small world.
In its most commonly acknowledged-but least controversial-form,
such cross-jurisdictional interaction among regulatory entities is purely
dialogic. In such cases, regulatory institutions with related missions
engage one another to exchange information, share ideas, and otherwise
Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. A.B., Princeton University,
1994; J.D. Yale University, 1997. I am grateful to Paul Berman, Bill Buzbee, Peter Lindseth, Hugh
Magill, Pat McCoy, Robert Schapiro, Greg Shafer, and attendees at the University of Connecticut
School of Law's Burritt Lecture on International Law and conference on Law Without Boundaries, for
their valuable counsel on earlier drafts of this Article.
1 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003).
2 While the present analysis is grounded in what can be understood as a supply-side treatment of
regulation, one can appreciate the above point from the demand-side as well: individuals, institutions,
and subject-matter issues increasingly manifest some cross-jurisdictional character. Multinational
corporations may be the most obvious examples of cross-jurisdictional institutions, while
environmental protection is a clear case of an issue not readily captured within any single jurisdiction.
The most resonant regulatory issue of the moment--the control of global terrorism-exhibits cross-
jurisdictional features of various forms.
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learn from each other. Examples of purely voluntary interactions among
regulatory entities situated across jurisdictional lines include regular
gatherings of the National Governors Association, the varied pursuits of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and much
of the work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO).
4
For the most part, such voluntary patterns of engagement have met little
resistance in the study of regulation. Less welcome-if even
acknowledged-has been a universe of cross-jurisdictional interactions
motivated by jurisdictional "overlap." In these cases, independent public
agencies enjoy regulatory authority over the same individuals or institutions,
with regard to the same or related issues. The extent of such overlap may be
more or less in any given case. The jurisdiction of federal and state regulators
to protect the environment exhibits substantial overlap. By comparison, the
authority of federal and state banking regulators overlaps more slightly.
Similarly, under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, national courts and international
tribunals must interact, but only regarding a relatively constrained universe of
issues.5 Whatever its breadth, however, the conventional account finds little
wisdom-and much to fear-in such overlap.
' This relatively voluntary pattern of engagement represents much of what has been studied under
the rubric of "regulatory cooperation." See generally TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION:
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L.
Lindseth eds., 2000) (offering analyses of international regulatory cooperation and its ad hoc
evolution). The literature of "cooperative federalism" is likewise about patterns of voluntary
engagement. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65, 82 (Daphne A.
Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) [hereinafter COMPETITION AMONG STATES]. Analysis of
transgovernmental networks, finally, is to similar effect. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that informal networks between different state actors will improve liberal
internationalism as a tool of global governance); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks,
Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003)
(exploring the history and nature of transgovernmental regulatory networks and asking whether they
can be reconciled with modern and postmodern concepts of democracy); see also David Zaring,
Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005).
Some significant emphasis of the latter literature, however, is on individual rather than institutional
engagements. See Slaughter, supra, at 1045-46, 1051-53. The networks of interaction among judges,
among market regulators, and among environmental policy-makers indisputably constitute an important
feature of the shrinking world noted above; they involve a distinct dynamic, however, from that which I
emphasize herein.
4 As the above examples suggest, the present discussion is not directed exclusively to what we
ordinarily think of as "regulatory agencies." Rather, the regulatory "entities" on whose interactions I
hope to shed light include executive, legislative, and judicial institutions more generally. The entities
engaged in intersystemic regulation are thus public regulatory agencies of one variety or another,
established by, and operating under the authority of, distinct jurisdictions-or "systems." Private
regulators of one form or another likely deserve incorporation into a comprehensive theory of
regulatory interaction across jurisdictional lines. See, e.g., infra note 41. This level of complexity,
however, is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
5 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
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Even less appreciated, in both senses of the word, have been interactions
in which the relevant institutional dynamic produces both jurisdictional
overlap and a degree of what I will term regulatory "dependence." In these
cases, engagement among regulators is even less voluntary in nature than in
cases of overlap alone.6 Rather, in this growing universe of regulatory
interactions, each agency's pursuit of its mandate is shaped-in a non-trivial
fashion-by the other entity's acts of commission or omission. Each entity
7is reliant on the other, in one way or another. As a result, there emerges a
regulatory regime characterized by increased interaction, of a more recurrent
nature, and by a close intermingling of regulatory conflict and cooperation.8
Ultimately, rather than increased regulatory cooperation supporting each
agency's pursuit of its own mission, we may even see something akin to
joint, or intertwined, regulation of relevant individuals, institutions, or
subject-matter. 9 In such regimes, discrete sets of regulatory rules may
collapse into a collective whole. t
By way of example, the present analysis highlights the regulation of
securities markets. As financial markets have become global in nature, the
enforcement of insider trading rules, the achievement of appropriate levels
of disclosure, and other regulatory pursuits have become cross-
jurisdictional endeavors, requiring the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to work in increasingly close fashion with its
transnational and foreign counterparts. Contemporaneously, the SEC has
been forced to engage various sub-national regulators, as most dramatically
highlighted in the recent case of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.
With his broad assertions of authority to regulate the New York financial
6 This is likely the most critical contribution of the present analysis, given the general orientation
of the aforementioned literatures to voluntary, cooperative patterns of interaction among regulatory
entities. This is largely the case in the study of transgovernmental networks, of cooperative federalism,
and of regulatory cooperation generally, and in some significant portion of the analysis of regulatory
interactions in particular subject-matter areas. A more comprehensive model, I would argue, needs to
better incorporate the elements of regulatory conflict that are equally present in cross-jurisdictional
regulatory interactions. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 243, 284 (2005); see also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495, 1554, 1556-57 (1999).
7 See infra Part V.B.
8 One might thus conceive of the pattern I describe herein as falling between the more familiar
realms of regulatory competition, see, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), and regulatory cooperation, see supra note 3.
9 See Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Supply Side to Blue-Sky
Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1279 (2004). At a minimum, we find something more than mere
"dual regulation"-overlap and overlap alone.
10 To closely related effect, Raustiala and Victor have explored the implications of a growing
density of international institutions. Such density gives rise to what they term "regime complexes," in
which multiple institutions intertwine and cannot be readily "decomposed" into their constituent parts.
See Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG.
277(2004).
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markets, Spitzer has repeatedly forced the SEC to follow his lead, or at
least to join in his regulatory endeavors.
Yet such patterns of regulatory engagement, which I characterize as
"intersystemic regulation," can be observed across an array of fields.
Under the No Child Left Behind Act, federal and state education officials
depend on one another's regulatory initiatives, mandates, and funding
commitments in pursuit of their own education goals." Transnationally,
one might note the reliance of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency on the
initiatives of various transnational and foreign regulators to combat money
laundering, and the aforementioned dependence of domestic courts and
international tribunals on one another under NAFTA. Perhaps the very
best examples of intersystemic regulation can be found in environmental
law, where the federal Environmental Protection Agency. and state
environmental regulators find themselves caught in complex-and
expanding-patterns of interdependence.
2
For the most part, patterns of intersystemic regulatory interaction
combining overlap and dependence have not been emphasized, in the
regulatory literature. 13  Notwithstanding the unavoidable familiarity with
" See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A.).
12 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism,
21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 214-15 (2002). The dual system of bank regulation in the United States is a
similarly clear example. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
13 This is not to suggest that there is no relevant analysis to be found. Administrative and
constitutional law scholars have explored such cross-jurisdictional regulatory interactions-though
primarily in particular subject-matter areas, such as occupational health and safety and public health
regulation. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:
A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEx. L.
REV. 1197, 1267 (2004). The most substantial analysis of such interactions in federal-state relations is
in environmental regulation. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental
Challenge to Federalism, 9 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 205 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). Robert
Schapiro's analysis of "polyphonic federalism" is the exceptional analysis of broader scope. See
Schapiro, supra note 6, at 252-53. Though somewhat oriented to intersystemic judicial interactions,
Schapiro's treatment is most closely akin to the present analysis.
More broadly, however, the burgeoning study of democratic experimentalism, see, e.g., Michael
C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267
(1998) (proposing a system of governance in which power is decentralized and local agencies cooperate
and share information through regional and national coordinating bodies to promote efficiency); the
various subject-matter specific studies of the "new governance" literature, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004) (detailing scholarship on recent innovative forms of public
governance, which reject the "familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by administrative
fiat," in favor of "a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem solving");
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (using paradigm of governance to describe legal
scholarship's shift away from the traditional model of formal state-produced regulation); and European
efforts to contrast the "classic community method [of regulation] ... based upon clear divisions of
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such patterns on the ground, theoretical accounts have inadequately
grappled with them. 14  Even where acknowledged, such regulatory
engagement is commonly disputed in one way or another. The extent of
overlap, some would insist, is overstated; lines of jurisdiction are
sufficiently clear. Even when overlap is self-evident, the presence of
meaningful dependence may be disputed, with challenges to the actual
power of one or the other regulatory authority to assert itself.15 Even when
overlap and dependence are undeniable, finally, there is the standard
dualist response: In the face of overlap and dependence, our normative task
is to more effectively delimit each entity's jurisdiction and authority, and
thereby eliminate the relevant overlap and dependence.' 6  The dualist
paradigm of the federalism literature, with its single-minded commitment
to the project ofjurisdictional line-drawing, is suggestive in this regard.' 7
Such reactions are hardly surprising. At heart, they reflect some
visceral sense of law's project as one of categorization, clear definition,
and line-drawing. Justice Scalia has spoken of the "Rule of Law" as the
"law of rules."'18 The majority in New York v. United States, with its
insistence on clear lines of federal and state accountability, spoke in a
competence" with various emerging forms of "collaborative and multi-level" governance, see Joanne
Scott & Jane Holder, Law and 'New' Environmental Governance in the European Union 4 (New Modes
of Governance Project, Paper LTFIA/D3d, 2006), available at http://www.eu-newgov.org/datalists/
deliverablesdetail.asp?Project ID=25a, including the so-called "open method of coordination," id at
15; see infra note 262, each offer some context to the analysis below. By contrast with the latter bodies
of work, however, I emphasize the particular issue of inter-governmental regulatory engagement-what
some have termed "multi-level collaborative governance." See Scott & Holder, supra, at 4; see also id.
at 15 (referring to "new partnership working method"); Griinne de Bfirca, The Constitutional
Challenge of New Governance in the European Union, 28 EuR. L. REV. 814, 820 (2003). This issue is
often overlooked, amidst the primary orientation of these literatures to other facets of regulatory
design-including the combination of wider standard-setting and local implementation of said
standards, information dissemination and analogous feedback mechanisms, and citizen and other
private participation.
14 In this sense, the present project can be construed as one of translation, cf Mark C. Suchman,
Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74 OR. L. REv. 257 (1995), here between
the messy reality of regulatory interaction and conventional theoretical accounts of regulatory systems.
15 If anything, the above discussion understates the degree of aversion to regulatory overlap and
dependence. Sharp criticism has been offered, on various grounds of accountability, legitimacy, and
utility. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings " Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 30 (2003) (describing conflict between "takings" standards of domestic courts and international
tribunals); William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 843, 851-
52 (2001) (suggesting difficulties of institutional multiplicity in antitrust); see also Schapiro, supra
note 6, at 291; cf Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part 11, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 98, 105-06 (2000) (suggesting growing treaty regulation of areas traditionally reserved to state
control); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
932, 933 (2004) (noting critiques of federal interference in education policy).
16 Cf Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International
Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 203-05 (2005) (noting efforts to define clear jurisdictional
boundaries in transnational antitrust regulation).
17 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 246-49.
18 Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).
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similar spirit.' 9
Yet such devotion to certainty and clarity-whatever its general
utility-has minimized our appreciation, let alone embrace, of selective
overlap and dependence in the interaction of regulatory entities across
jurisdictional lines. A constrained mental map of potential patterns of
regulatory design has caused us to overlook the presence of the divergent
patterns described above. While corporate and securities scholars have
showered endless attention on the internal affairs doctrine-a doctrine
whose essential function is to minimize regulatory overlap and
dependence2 -they have had far less to say about the muddled reality of
corporate and securities regulation in practice.2'
Thus, while theories of regulation abound, a theory of intersystemic
regulation is lacking. The present analysis seeks to outline such a theory.
In necessarily preliminary form, I explore the value and nature of
intersystemic regulation-cross-jurisdictional interactions characterized by
jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence-and particularly of the
strongest forms of such engagement, which I term "dialectical
regulation. 22 Given their increasing prevalence, I would suggest, analysis
of intersystemic regulatory interactions can and should shift from the
margins of regulation theory to its center. In calling attention to the
realities of overlap and dependence in modern regulatory regimes and
exploring the integration of intersysternic and dialectical regulation into
prevailing accounts of regulation, this Article seeks to begin this shift.
Across a variety of subjects-among them some of the most
contentious topics in law today-such a shift toward greater awareness and
appreciation of intersystemic regulation may be invaluable. Minimally, it
may enhance our insight into the dynamic at work in these areas; at best, it
may suggest alternative approaches to thorny challenges. Ongoing debates
over federalism, for example, seem trapped in unnecessarily binary
conceptions of the vertical allocation of power. Yet, a third way for the
resolution of federalism questions-and one more closely comporting with
the realities of day-to-day governance-might well be found in the overlap
and dependence of intersystemic and dialectical regulation. Though a
'9 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
20 See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J.
CORP. L. 625, 630 (2004).
21 In this spirit, one might note the sharp challenge that Mark Roe's recent work on federal-state
competition has seemed to present to the dominant analysis. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From 'Federalization' to
'Mixed Governance'in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005).
22 I have previously explored analogous interactions among judicial institutions, under the rubric
of "dialectical review," see Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2029 (2004), a term I extrapolated from Robert Cover and Alex
Aleinikoff's seminal theory of "dialectical federalism," see Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
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degree removed, something similar might be said of the increasingly
heated disagreements over U.S. courts' citation to foreign authorities.
Once we allow for a more complex account of the allocation of power
across jurisdictional lines, the perceived appropriateness of such citation
might be expected to increase or decrease, depending on the particular
relationship in play. In the growing body of "new governance"
scholarship, and the study of transnational networks, of course, the
relevance of intersystemic regulation is even clearer.
Several caveats are in order. Most importantly, the present analysis
does not seek to offer a general model of regulation, or even a
comprehensive account of intersystemic or dialectical regulation.23 Nor is
the present analysis a broadly normative argument about cross-
jurisdictional interactions. Descriptive, positive, and normative elements
intertwine in this necessarily preliminary exploration. The ensuing
discussion might thus be best understood to offer a frame for the closer
study of cross-jurisdictional regulatory interactions. It sets out a working
construct for the "microanalysis of institutions" prescribed by Edward
Rubin, here targeted to the varied institutions of regulatory interaction
across jurisdictional lines.24 Much more consequently remains to be said
of intersystemic regulation. The present analysis, however, may constitute
a useful first step. At a minimum, it moves us beyond the empty
dichotomy of conventional jurisdictional line-drawing, on the one hand,
and an undifferentiated universe of "other" approaches, on the other.
I begin, in Part II, by outlining the recent experience of the SEC with
the patterns of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence noted
above. I offer the latter experience both as a frame of reference and source
23 In any given circumstance, thus, other institutional designs-such as regulatory competition-
may better secure the benefits of intersystemic regulation that I enumerate in Part Ill.
24 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1996). The inherent generalization of the
present analysis thus has its limits. Important features of regulatory interactions across jurisdictional
lines are likely to be influenced by the particular regulatory modality--"legislating to address a new
risk, setting environmental standards in legislation or a regulation, tailoring regulatory requirements to
a particular setting, or taking enforcement actions against law violators"-that is at work. William W.
Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 112-13 (2006)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Contextual] (encouraging attention to modalities and context of relevant regulation
in analysis of environmental federalism); see also William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation
Continuum, Westway and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 356-57 (2005)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Westway]; Caroline de la Porte, Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate
for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, 8 EUR. L.J. 38 (2002)
(discussing how the application of an open method of coordination can vary based on the policy area to
which it is applied). That Eliot Spitzer is engaged in the application of state law-specifically, the
Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (2006)-rather than federal mandates for which the SEC is
directly responsible, is thus an important aspect of his interaction with the SEC, and one distinguishing
it from incidents of delegated program federalism, where a federal mandate is at stake. Further, that
Spitzer is engaged in enforcement actions and is not, as such, the relevant law-maker is also important
in any understanding of his relationship with the SEC.
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of pertinent examples, but also to dispute-if only through the anecdotal
experience of the SEC-notions of intersystemic regulation as a rare
phenomenon. Regulatory overlap and dependence, from the SEC's
perspective, could not be more real.25
In Part III, I identify four substantial benefits of regulatory overlap and
dependence: acknowledging more effectively the complex identity of the
subjects of regulation; overcoming regulatory inertia; encouraging
innovation in regulatory design; and facilitating integration across
jurisdictional lines. Conventional regulatory accounts of overlap and
dependence-and resulting patterns of intersystemic regulation-are
incomplete without some acknowledgement of their benefits. Given these
benefits, intersystemic regulation deserves a place in the toolbox of
regulatory design.
If neither denial nor dismissal of intersystemic regulation (and its
precursors) is in order-if it is real and has utility-we may better
understand such regulation through an appreciation of both its relationship
to other patterns of regulatory interaction across jurisdictional lines and its
own varied forms. To this end, Part IV develops a typology of regulatory
engagement, defined by (1) the degree of dependence in the relevant
relationship and (2) the valence of any such dependence-whether a
bidirectional interdependence or a unidirectional, non-reciprocal, or even
hierarchical dependence of one agency on the other. Within this typology,
we can plot out a range of potential interactions, from bounds of pure
hierarchy and pure dialogue, to various forms of intersystemic regulation
falling between these bounds, consummating in the strong-form
intersystemic regulation I term dialectical regulation. With an eye to this
broad typology of regulatory interactions, Part IV goes on to enumerate
some of the criteria that might favor patterns of engagement at or closer to
one pole or the other.
This leaves for Part V a fuller exposition of the strong engagement of
dialectical regulation, standing at the heart of our typology. This is the
consummate-and consequently most controversial-form of intersystemic
regulation, in which significant overlap and interdependence combine to
produce a degree of regulatory integration. Here, we find an active, iterative,
and potentially even institutionalized, pattern of substantive regulatory
engagement across jurisdictional lines, between simultaneously competing
and coordinating regulators. Ultimately, such engagement might be
expected to produce some pattern of co-regulation, in which collective
regulatory norms can no longer be meaningfully parsed out as the product of
25 In focusing on the SEC, I do not mean to suggest that the pattern I describe is unique to the
SEC, or even that the SEC is the best example of the pattern. Environmental regulation may offer even
clearer indicia of intersystemic and dialectical regulation. Given my relative familiarity with the SEC's
work, where such patterns are clearly on display, I highlight it by way of example.
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one regulatory entity or the other.
If intersystemic regulation offers significant potential payoffs, as
described in Part III, those benefits are at their acme with the active and
pronounced engagements of dialectical regulation. Part V thus identifies
the predictive-and prescriptive-elements of a regulatory regime suited to
this pattern of regulatory engagement. What features, it asks, might
facilitate patterns of cross-jurisdictional regulatory interaction along the
strong-form lines of dialectical regulation? Among others, I suggest the
presence of some alignment and some divergence in perspectives across
relevant jurisdictional lines; a certain density of regulatory interaction; and
some opportunity for exit-an escape valve of sorts. As a matter of policy,
if the universe of individuals, institutions, and subjects operating across
jurisdictional lines truly is expanding, inclusion of such features in
regulatory schemes-and the resulting prospect of dialectical regulation-
may be of increasing importance in effective governance. In any case, it
may be an unavoidable reality.
In negotiating the overlap of regulatory authority across jurisdictional
lines, the traditional lawyerly task has been one of line-drawing.
Practitioners and scholars of law have seen their comparative advantage in
the definition of clear bounds between the jurisdiction of independent
regulatory authorities.26  Most commonly, they have done so by denying
the existence of overlap; where this proves inadequate, they have sought to
define jurisdiction so as to eliminate what overlap might exist. In a
shrinking world, however, such responses may be neither viable nor wise.
A more resonant project might therefore be that of the poet. This
26 Brad Karkkainen highlights this attitude, and suggests a contrasting approach, in the following
excerpt:
Lawyers like rules. We like enforceable rules. We want our rules to be optimal,
tidy, and timeless. And we prefer the institutions that make and enforce them also to
be tidy, fitting neatly into the boxes on Mr. Madison's flow chart, with clear
divisions of authority between rule-maker and ruled, between the rule-making, rule-
executing, and rule-adjudicating powers, and between federal, state and local (well,
at any rate, federal and state) tiers of government. Indeed, that has been the major
thrust of public law over the course of our nation's history ....
Collaborative ecosystem management, by contrast, is often messy, elaborate,
cumbersome, ad hoc, and defiantly unconventional. Lines of authority and divisions
of responsibility are often neither formal nor transparent; institutional boundaries are
fluid and permeable, if institutions can be discerned at all; and roles, identities, and
allegiances are blurred in a jumble of hybrid public-private, national-and-local
arrangements. Rules tend to be provisional and, for that matter, may not even be
enforceable through the familiar channels of formal, compulsory processes. This all
may sound singularly unpromising, especially to lawyers and legal scholars
accustomed to policing relatively sharp-edged rules and lines of authority. It is hard
to see where accountability comes from when the lines of authority become so
blurred that no single party can be identified as the authoritative decision-maker. It
violates our deep-seated sense of order, and it may even appear incompatible with
'the rule of law as a law of rules,' to borrow Justice Scalia's phrase.
Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 234-35 (citations omitted).
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project lies not in line-drawing, distinguishing, or simplifying. To the
contrary, it explores-and even encourages-overlap, interdependence,
and attendant complexity. From this distinct regulatory perspective, the
goal is not to identify the single regulatory actor best suited or most
appropriately charged with responsibility for a given entity or subject-
matter. Rather, multiple regulators are embraced as having a shared-if
both competing and cooperating-place in a more inclusive and all-
encompassing regulatory regime.27
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: JURISDICTIONAL
OVERLAP AND REGULATORY DEPENDENCE, AT HOME AND ABROAD
The SEC is among the most influential regulatory agencies in the
world. It has been widely acclaimed, if also forcefully criticized, for the
impact it has had on U.S. and global financial markets since its creation in
1934. In recent years, however, the SEC has been under growing stress.
Among the most notable aspects of its plight has been growing pressure to
coordinate its pursuits with a variety of other domestic, foreign, and
transnational market regulators.
Of late, particular attention has been showered on the SEC's
interactions with New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.28 Spitzer has
pursued an aggressive agenda of enforcement actions against individuals
and entire industries operating in the New York financial markets, thereby
undermining the longstanding, if informal, allocation of responsibility for
national securities cases to the SEC and small-time fraud cases to state
regulators. 29 Beginning with a bang in April 2002, Spitzer announced a
court order against Merrill Lynch-among Wall Street's most venerated
institutions---demanding that the firm restructure its investment counseling
practices to minimize conflicts of interest arising from research analysts'
simultaneous duty to their clients and desire to bring investment banking
27 "The institutional arrangements in question depend upon, rather than resist, political
fragmentation." Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 21. Within the European open method of
coordination, thus, "an attempt to define distinct and separate roles for the Member States and the EU
respectively is not a major concern ... the process is a very mixed one with intersecting roles for
national and EU actors at various stages." de Bfirca, supra note 13, at 826.
28 See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 114-15 (2005). It bears noting, however, that Spitzer was not
alone among state regulators in injecting himself into the traditional domain of the SEC. See id. at 120
(describing the Massachusetts secretary of state's investigation of Putnam Funds); see also Di Trolio,
supra note 9, at 1280.
29 See Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of
Securities Enforcement, 1487 PLI/Corp 399, 406 (2005). That the relationships at work in corporate
and securities law are in significant flux is evident in a flurry of recent work, including Jones, supra
note 20; Roe, supra note 21; Robert J. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 961 (2003); Robert J.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Law as Corporate Law, Reflections Upon Federalism,
56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
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business to their firm. 30
In challenging Merrill Lynch's investment practices, Spitzer proceeded
under the Martin Act, a once obscure provision of New York law.3' "[The
Act's] basic provision, as [Louis] Loss ... observed, 'has a majestic, one-
sentence sweep.' 32  Based on "evidence satisfactory to [the Attorney
General]" that a party has engaged in fraudulent practices in connection with
a security (or commodity), the Attorney General is authorized to sue to
enjoin those practices and to enjoin the defendant from selling securities in
the state, and to seek any further relief he deems "proper. 33
After securing an agreement with Merrill Lynch to make changes to its
investment counseling business, Spitzer pushed further, to secure a broader
settlement with the major Wall Street firms regarding research analysts'
conflicts of interests. By the end of 2002, he had done just that. In
conjunction with the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
the North American Securities Administrators Association, the New York
Stock Exchange, and various state regulators, Spitzer announced a "global
settlement" dictating elaborate reforms across the brokerage industry.34
Spitzer then turned to other issues, including investment banks'
selective provision of access to IPO shares and alleged cases of
35impermissible executive compensation. Most significant, however, was
his aggressive pursuit of widespread misconduct in the mutual fund
industry. Initially, Spitzer pursued Morgan Stanley brokers' promotion of
in-house funds without disclosure of their elevated commissions for the
sale of those funds.36 More significant, however, was his discovery of the
widespread engagement of mutual fund management companies in
impermissible after-hours trading and market timing.37 This investigation
30 See R. William Ide Ill & Douglas H. Yam, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating
Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1138-39
n.121 (2003); see also Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Ball is Over: Investor Remedies in the Wake of the
Dot-Corn Crash and Recent Corporate Scandals, 83 NEB. L. REV. 732, 736 n.l 8 (2005).
31 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (2006); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and
Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the
Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 951, 960-61 (2005).
32 See Macey, supra note 31, at 960.
33 See id. Perhaps most dramatically, the Act cites a refusal to testify as prima facie proof of
fraud, for purposes of granting a permanent injunction. See id.
34 See R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of
Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REv. 829, 831 n. 16 (2003) (citing Press
Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA,
NYSE, and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20,
2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20b_02.html).
35 Complaint, State v. Anschutz, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/
sep/sep30c 02 complaint.pdf.
36 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Galvin, Spitzer Announce
Joint Inquiry into Sale of Mutual Funds by Morgan Stanley (July 14, 2003), http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2003/jul/jul14a 03.html.
37 See Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in Corporate Governance, I N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 219, 221 n.5 (2004) (citing Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
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tracked Spitzer's first, culminating in a series of dramatic agreements with
the largest investment companies in the country, settling innumerable after-
hours trading and market timing claims.38 As with his investment
counseling settlements, moreover, these settlements went beyond fines and
penalties to impose significant new fiduciary obligations on the directors of
mutual fund companies.
39
Faced with Spitzer's significant incursions into regulatory domain
traditionally viewed as its own,40 the SEC was stirred to action.4' Whether
because of the enthusiastic reception to Spitzer's efforts, its own political
weakness amidst recent corporate scandals, or other reasons, however, the
SEC is best characterized as having simply "joined 'em., 42 As to research
analysts, the SEC participated in the "Global Resolution" regarding
investment counseling43 and also adopted Regulation AC, mandating the
truthfulness of analyst views expressed in research reports and public
appearances. 44 Similarly, the SEC joined in numerous Spitzer claims
against, and settlements with, mutual fund companies,45 and introduced
new compliance rules for the latter.46
Announces Market-Timing Settlement with Banc One Investment Advisors Corporation (June 29,
2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/Jun/jun29d_04.html; Press Release, Office of N.Y. State
Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, S.E.C. Reach Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/mar/marl5c_04.html).
" See id
39 See id It bears noting that, as Spitzer's various enforcement efforts proceeded, they
increasingly engaged the participation of state attorneys general from across the country. Perhaps most
notable was Spitzer's formation of a multi-state task force, co-chaired by New York, New Jersey, and
California officials, and charged to investigate securities law violations at Wall Street investment firms.
See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer to Co-Chair National Task
Force Investigating Securities Law Violations (Apr. 23, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/apr/apr23a_02.html.
40 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
41 See Jones, supra note 20, at 639. It bears noting that I leave out of this analysis, for purposes of
simplicity, self-regulatory organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange, NASD, and the like-
the third major regulator of the securities markets. See Di Trolio, supra note 9, at 1298-99.
42 This is not to suggest that the SEC did so with enthusiasm. To the contrary, it objected strongly
to Spitzer's interventions, at least at the early stages. See Jones, supra note 28, at 115-16 & n.45.
43 Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough on the "Judicial Oak": The Second Circuit
Clarifies Inquiry Notice and its Loss Causation Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 485, 498 & n.75 (2005).
4 Regulation Analyst Certification, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482 (Feb. 27, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.501); see also William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time
of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 965-66 (2005).
45 Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Invesco and AIM Settle Mutual
Fund Timing Cases (Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/sep/sep7c_04.html; Press
Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Pilgrim Baxter Settles Market Timing Case
(June 21, 2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun2la_04.h-ml; Press Release, Office of
N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, SEC Reach Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever
(Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/mar/marl5c04.html.
46 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714
(Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38-1, 275.206(4)-7, 275.204-2 & 279.1).
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Through its involvement, however, the SEC not only responded to
Spitzer's initiatives but also shaped them.47 While Spitzer's initial efforts
were undertaken with relatively little advance consultation with the SEC, and
pursued with limited attention to the SEC's positions and concerns, this
changed with time.48 Spitzer increasingly approached the SEC as an
erstwhile partner, minimally in his settlement of cases, but even in their
initiation and pursuit. With both the SEC and Spitzer facing a degree of
interdependence in their pursuit of a largely shared anti-fraud mission,
directed at perpetrators subject to their overlapping jurisdiction, a certain
degree of regulatory integration emerged.49 Today, investment counseling
and mutual fund practices are subject to a collective body of rules-
particularly in the relevant global settlements--dictated not by the SEC or
the New York Attorney General, but by them jointly.50 Important elements
in the present-day regulation of New York financial markets are thus a
product of coordinated regulatory initiatives of federal and state authorities. 5 '
Over the slightly longer window of the last twenty years, one can find
parallel patterns of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence
between the SEC and its foreign and transnational counterparts.52 While
some significant part of the SEC's engagement with the latter has involved
informal and episodic interactions, more formal and recurrent patterns of
interaction are increasingly common. 53  Such engagement includes both
bilateral and multilateral interactions.
54
Most significant among the bilateral interactions have been those
arising from the SEC's efforts to enforce U.S. standards and modes of
market regulation overseas. As the securities markets have grown
47 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer Responds to Rep.
Richard Baker's Letter to the SEC (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/
apr30a_02.html ("[M]y office has had productive meetings with, and we plan to continue working with
the SEC and other regulators to implement nationwide reforms ... "); Press Release, Office of N.Y.
State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Statement By Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the Comments
of U.S. Representative Michael Oxley (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/jan/
jan24b_03.html (discussing Spitzer's insistence on his commitment to the application of federal
securities law standards).
48 See Di Trolio, supra note 9, at 1279-80.49 See id at 1281.
SO To this effect, one might also note the active cooperation of the SEC and Spitzer in the course
of the investigations, for which they paired up in teams to assess individual firms and otherwise divided
up responsibilities. See Jones, supra note 28, at 118-19.
51 Of course, this pattern is not universal. Congress' selective preemption of state securities law
in the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act, adopted in 1998, were important steps away from the intersystemic regulatory dynamic
I describe herein. See Jones, supra note 28, at 113-14.
52 See International Agreements and Understandings for the Production of Information and Other
Mutual Assistance, 29 INT'L LAW. 780, 795-96, 814-17, 823 (1995) [hereinafter International
Agreements].
" See id. at 795-96.
14 See id. at 796.
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increasingly globalized, market activity of interest to the SEC increasingly
occurs in locales across the globe.55 Among the drivers of this pattern have
been- dramatic increases in trading volume generally and in foreign
portfolio investment particularly.56 The increase in foreign listings and
cross-listings has likewise encouraged this trend,5 7 especially when coupled
with growing transnational competition for listings. 58  In this spirit, one
might note the London Stock Exchange's aggressive advertising of the
inapplicability of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to its listings.59
Such patterns of market globalization have added considerably to the
complexity of securities enforcement. While this increased complexity is
evident in any number of areas, it may be most notable with regard to U.S.
insider trading rules. For many years, the United States deviated from global
norms in its restriction of insider trading.60 Even aside from this obvious
obstacle to enforcement, however, foreign limitations on discovery and
foreign secrecy laws stymied the investigation of insider trading overseas.
61
.Until the mid-1980s, the SEC sought to enforce U.S. insider trading
rules through the blunt instrument of non-cooperative, direct enforcement
efforts against non-citizens overseas.62 Unsurprisingly, such efforts were a
source of ongoing conflict between the SEC and its foreign counterparts,
including foreign courts.63 Reliance on U.S. courts to compel production
of foreign-based information was also costly and time-consuming.
64
However powerful and dominant U.S. regulators and securities markets
were, the SEC could not easily impose its will in a global marketplace.65
As it gradually acknowledged as much, the SEC undertook a
succession of initiatives, progressively constructing what might be seen as
a web of co-regulation of securities markets across the globe--shaped in
55 See John G. Moon, The Dangerous Territoriality of American Securities Law: A Proposal for
an Integrated Global Securities Market, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 131, 133 (2000).
56 See Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace,
45 ALA. L. REv. 927, 930-31 (1994).
7 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1772-73 (2002).
" See id.
59 See John Plender, Come to London for a Sympathetic Exchange: A Convenient SOX-Free Zone,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 26, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS File. The London Stock
Exchange's Alternative Investment Market, meanwhile, is competing for small cap trading, which would
otherwise be traded on NASDAQ's Bulletin Board or the 'pink sheets.' See Mark Boslet, Some Venture-
Backed IPOs Look to London's AIM as Nasdaq Cools, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2005, at B4.
6 See Viveca Hostetter, Comment, Turning Insider Trading Inside Out in the European Union,
30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 175, 191-92, 196 (1999).
61 International Agreements, supra note 52, at 795-96; see also Michael D. Mann & William P.
Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT'L LAW. 937, 940
(2005).
62 International Agreements, supra note 52, at 795.
63 Id.
"Id. at 795-96.
65 See Mann & Barry, supra note 61, at 940.
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equal parts by SEC demands and by countervailing foreign values.
Initially, the SEC entered into narrow agreements to facilitate foreign
assistance in its regulatory efforts.66 As the scope of those efforts
expanded, however, such constrained agreements proved too unwieldy a
mechanism to support the SEC's work. Instead, the SEC and market
regulators in major foreign markets adopted various "memoranda of
understanding," providing for broad tools of engagement and coordination
in their enforcement efforts.67 Among other things, relevant terms
provided for enforcement assistance and broader discovery than otherwise
afforded by the signatory foreign jurisdictions.68
Ultimately, even the memoranda of understanding proved inadequate,
as global financial markets grew yet larger and more sophisticated. The
SEC thus undertook to press for the adoption of U.S.-style insider trading
rules in individual markets with significant market trading activity.69
Though met with initial resistance, persistent efforts at dialogue and
education ultimately bore fruit, as major markets gradually joined the
United States in barring insider trading. Even this advance initially fell
short, however, given lax foreign enforcement, as in Germany's early
failure to impose any sanction for insider trading.70 With yet further SEC
engagement, such enforcement issues were likewise addressed,71 producing
insider trading rules directed to U.S. ends, yet shaped significantly by
compromise with distinct normative conceptions prevailing in the
enforcing jurisdictions.
Beyond bilateral engagements to constrain insider trading, a further
example of transnational overlap and dependence, falling somewhere
between bilateral and multilateral interactions of the SEC, is the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), presently in force only with
Canada but susceptible to invocation between the SEC and other foreign
66 See International Agreements, supra note 52, at 795-96.
67 See id An example was the September 23, 1991 joint statement of the SEC and the European
Commission regarding mutual cooperation, which provided for collaboration to facilitate the exchange
of information and mutual assistance. Id. at 814.
68 See id at 796. The Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss
Confederation and the United States is emblematic in this regard, with its provisions for "broad
assistance in ... criminal matters... including assistance in locating witnesses, obtaining statements
and testimony of witnesses, production and authentication of business records, and service ofjudicial or
administrative documents." Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
69 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
283, 293 (2004) (discussing regulatory export policy).
70 See Anupama J. Naidu, Comment, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley
Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
271, 300-01 (2004) (discussing limited enforcement of insider trading regulations in Germany).
71 See Raustiala, supra note 3, at 33; cf Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in
the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT'L LAW. 667, 669 (2005) (describing increase
in foreign regulatory activity, in response to SEC's enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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regulators as well. Under the mutual recognition scheme of the MJDS,
compliance with the disclosure standards of one participating jurisdiction
permits marketing in the other without further disclosures.72 The operation
of such an administrative system, however, necessarily requires significant
interaction and coordination between the relevant regulatory agencies," and
the development of standards of disclosure amenable to both.
More clearly multilateral has been the SEC's pursuit of a number of its
regulatory objectives under the auspices of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Formed in 1983, IOSCO's membership
today encompasses 181 national and sub-national securities market
regulators.74 At its inception, the IOSCO attracted little SEC involvement.
Over time, however, the SEC became a more active participant, seeking to
promote U.S.-style market regulation across the globe. The SEC, for
example, has been involved in IOSCO's efforts to develop international
standards for non-financial statement disclosure, and thereby facilitate cross-
border financing and listing by transnational companies.75
To somewhat similar effect has been the relationship of the SEC with
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its predecessor
committee. Since 1973, the IASB has promoted the creation of a common
set of accounting standards for universal adoption.76 For many years, the
SEC was among the least cooperative national participants in these efforts,
seeming to take the position that the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles were incapable of improvement.77 More recently, however, the
SEC has joined more actively and regularly in the work of the IASB.7 8
Faced with the indisputable need for common standards in the operation of
a global financial market, and the likelihood that some standard would
ultimately emerge, the SEC has again elected to "join 'em." In light of the
dominance of the IASB's standards, the SEC has sought to ensure
incorporation of its views and concerns into their design. Although still
unprepared to endorse wholesale adoption of the standards, the SEC has
72 Ruth 0. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation Standards Between Canada and the
United States, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 465, 468-70 (2004).
73 See Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Convergence and Beyond, Speech at the
United States-Europe Symposium: Program on International Financial Systems 1 (Nov. 15, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl1503rcc.htm (discussing ways in which U.S. and Canadian
regulators can cooperate to improve the MJDS).
" OICU-IOSCO, IOSCO Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?
section-history (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
75 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of
Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1170 (1999).
76 David Van Zandt, Convergence: Challenges, Controversies and Collaboration, 25 NW. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 509, 509 (2005).
77 See Stephen A. Zeff, U.S. GAAP Confronts the IASB: Roles of the SEC and the European
Commission, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 879, 880 (2003).71 See id at 882-83.
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shown growing receptivity to them, most recently evident in its decision to
permit foreign issuers to use them.79
Ultimately, the SEC's various engagements with foreign and
transnational regulators have gained sufficient importance so as to require
institutionalization within the SEC. In 1989, the SEC established its Office
of International Affairs.80 Charged to "promote[] investor protection in the
global capital market by advancing international regulatory and
enforcement cooperation [and] promoting the adoption of high regulatory
standards worldwide,' the Office of International Affairs coordinates a
growing pattern of regulatory cooperation and coordination with foreign
and multinational regulatory entities.
Perceptions of the SEC as among the strongest regulatory agencies
within the so-called "fourth branch" of the U.S. government remain well-
justified. The SEC continues to be respected by Congress and the White
House, by deferential courts, and in both the national and international
financial community. As the foregoing examples make clear, however, the
SEC is increasingly less and less alone in its regulatory pursuits. Rather,
its jurisdiction increasingly overlaps with that of its sub-national, foreign,
and transnational counterparts. Further, important aspects of the SEC's
regulatory project have come to depend significantly on cooperation and
coordination with those counterparts. From Eliot Spitzer to the IASB, a
world of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence have led the
SEC to a paradigm of regulatory engagement dramatically different from
what has gone before.
III. THE ENDS OF INTERSYSTEMIC REGULATION:
IDENTITY, INERTIA, INNOVATION, AND INTEGRATION
If the experience of the SEC in recent years is representative,
overlapping jurisdiction and a certain dependence on other regulatory entities
are an unavoidable fact of life for the modem administrative agency. With
notable exceptions, however, scholars of regulation have been inattentive to
those patterns and the resulting dynamic of regulatory interaction across
jurisdictional lines. Even when acknowledged, the significance of any
observed overlap and dependence is commonly downplayed. More
importantly for present purposes, when overlap and dependence cannot be
denied, the contrary aspirations of dualism are invoked by way of response.
Predictability, accountability, and legitimacy, among a litany of other pious
virtues, are trotted out to demand that lines of jurisdiction be drawn so as to
79 First-Time Application of International Financial Reporting Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 12904
(proposed Mar. 18, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249).
80 Office ofInternational Affairs Established, SEC NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 19, 1989, at 1.
SI U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Office of International Affairs, http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oia.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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eliminate the prospect of overlap and dependence.
.Before further exploring the patterns of regulatory engagement
manifest in the recent experience of the SEC, it is useful to place criticisms
of overlap and dependence in some perspective. I begin, as such, by
considering the potential utility of a degree of jurisdictional overlap and
regulatory dependence, and of resulting patterns of intersystemic
regulation. As the SEC negotiates its overlapping enforcement authority
with Eliot Spitzer, pursues memoranda of understanding with national
market regulators in Europe, and coordinates with Canadian -securities
regulators under the MJDS, what are the benefits? Why might we choose
to reject the dualist imperative and embrace a pattern of overlapping and
dependent regulatory authority? From distinct vantages, a handful of
scholars have suggested potential answers.
Responding to critics of expansive federal court jurisdiction twenty-
five years ago, Robert Cover sought to enumerate the benefits of what he
termed "jurisdictional redundancy" between federal and state judiciaries.8 2
To begin, such redundancy might serve as an effective constraint on
judicial corruption. In Cover's terms, judges' individual "interests" might
be more effectively excluded from decision-making where extrinsic review
and judicial competition of a sort are introduced. 3 To similar effect, Cover
saw redundancy as an antidote to substantive bias in adjudication-to the
influence of judges' individual "ideology. 8 4  Thus, jurisdictional
redundancy between federal and state courts might diminish the ability of
judges to inject their idiosyncratic preferences and personal prejudices into
their decision-making. Finally, jurisdictional redundancy might encourage
judicial "innovation," by creating an extrinsic source of pressure and
ideas.8 5 In this, Cover drew on his earlier suggestion, offered jointly with
Alex Aleinikoff, that the overlapping authority of state courts and lower
federal courts over the rules of constitutional criminal procedure had
helped to advance the development of that body of law.86
82 See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
83 Id. at 658-59; see also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute
Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 708 n.33 (1999).
84 Cover, supra note 82, at 664 (explaining that the source of substantive adjudicative bias may be
the fact that "the decisionmaker's construction of reality was distorted by the social determinants of his
mental world").
8 See id. at 672-73.
86 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 22; see also Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International
Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 465-66 (2003) ("As Robert Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff
pointed out in their article on 'dialectic federalism,' ... 'jurisdictional rules link state and federal
tribunals and create areas of overlap in which neither system can claim total sovereignty,' thus
triggering a dialogue between federal and state courts through which constitutional values could be
translated into legal rules by way of a dialectic process. Certain legal doctrines, Cover and Aleinikoff
suggest, 'structured a dialogue on the future of constitutional requirements in criminal law in which
state and federal courts were required both to speak and listen as equals."' (quoting Cover &
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Exploring the appropriate scope of personal jurisdiction in the face of
both globalization and the growing role of cyberspace in economic and
social ordering, Paul Berman has suggested the need to extend our
conventional conceptions.87 In the face of a changing global landscape,
Berman posits that "minimum contacts" can no longer serve as the
appropriate metric of jurisdictional reach.88 In some cases, the exercise of
jurisdiction may be unwarranted, notwithstanding a minimal degree of
contact; in others, the absence of such contact may not constitute a
coherent bar to jurisdiction. Instead, Berman encourages a focus on the
"communities" with which a subject individual or entity identifies.89 From
this, he develops what he terms a "cosmopolitan pluralist" conception of
jurisdiction9°--"cosmopolitan," to acknowledge the multiple identities of
individuals and entities within a globalized community, and "pluralist," to
suggest the multiple sources of authority in play, of both formal and
informal varieties. Berman's vision thus rests on a conception of regulated
entities as subject to multiple nodes of control and influence.
Most recently, Robert Schapiro has offered a model of "interactive
federalism" as a substitute for the failed project of dual federalism.91
While the latter seeks to draw lines between realms of federal and state
authority, Schapiro grapples with a reality of jurisdictional overlap. Extant
approaches to federalism, in Schapiro's view, do not adequately serve their
asserted ends.92 Perhaps most notably, they offer little more than a fig leaf
Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 1047-48)). I have also previously drawn on this strand of analysis,
positing the potential for innovation in international norms of due process, through a dialectical
interaction over the shared jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals established under Chapter 11
of the North American Free Trade Agreement and domestic courts. See Ahdieh, supra note 22.
87 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311,409 (2002)
[hereinafter Berman, Globalization] (asserting that "it is not sufficient simply to rely on what seems to
be settled law at this particular moment in history without at least considering the possibility that the
rise of online interaction and the increasing globalization of transportation and commerce might require
new shifts in those settled jurisdictional rules"); see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law
to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819 (2005).
8 Berman, Globalization, supra note 87, at 499-501.
89 Id. at 321 (arguing "that, just as a rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave
way in the first part of the twentieth century to the idea of jurisdiction based on contacts with a
sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach must now yield to a conception of jurisdiction based
on community definition").
90 Id. at 322 ("A cosmopolitan approach allows us to think of community not as a geographically
determined territory circumscribed by fixed boundaries, but as 'articulated moments in networks of social
relations and understandings.' This dynamic understanding of the relationship between the 'local'
community and other forms of community affiliation (regional, national, transnational, international,
cosmopolitan) permits us to conceptualize legal jurisdiction in terms of social interactions that are fluid
processes, not motionless demarcations frozen in time and space." (internal citation omitted)).
91 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 248 (proposing "an alternative concept of federalism that focuses
on the interaction of state and national governments ... [because the] key to understanding the promise
of federalism lies in considering state and national power not in isolation, but in interconnection").
92 See id. at 274-75 (using the No Child Left Behind Act to illustrate problems inherent in dual
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of protection for state regulation, given the juxtaposition of broad
preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause doctrines alongside more
prominent, yet quite limited, constraints on the federal government's
Commerce Clause authority.93
Schapiro identifies a series of potential benefits of a contrary approach
to federal and state authority, which recognizes an overlapping capacity to
regulate a wide range of issues. To begin, Schapiro can be read to suggest
that such overlap, and a resulting interactive federalism, may most
effectively serve the asserted goals of dual federalism, including the
heightened efficiency of regulatory competition, the expansion of
opportunities for public engagement in political discourse, and the
constraint of tyranny. 94 Further, Schapiro identifies a succession of goals
served particularly by interactive federalism: first, such a regime offers a
"plurality" of regulatory approaches to particular issues;95  second,
regulatory overlap is likely to enhance the extent of "dialogue" surrounding
the construction and evolution of regulatory choices; 96 finally, Schapiro
sees his interactive federalism as serving fail-safe goals of "redundancy. 97
With an eye to the recent regulatory experience of the SEC, and
drawing on these several analyses, I identify four critical benefits of
jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence, and of resulting patterns
of intersystemic regulation and "dialectical regulation," which I construct
as the strongest form of intersystemic regulation.98  First, overlap,
dependence, and ensuing intersystemic regulation may better capture the
true nature of regulated individuals and institutions and thereby enhance
federalism).
93Id. at 260-64.
9See id. at 288-90.
95 Id. at 288 ("With the overlap of federal and state power comes the possibility of multiple
approaches to a particular problem. State and federal governments operate within different institutional
frameworks, which give them varying perspectives. Their different geographical scope also may
endow them with divergent strengths and weaknesses. Some solutions may work better when imposed
nationally, while others function more efficiently on a local scale." (citing PAUL E. PETERSON, THE
PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-20 (1995))).
9 Id. ("[The concurrence of federal and state authority provides a valuable opportunity for dialogue.
The states and the federal government can attempt alternative means of preventing employment
discrimination or defining the fundamental right to privacy. The different governments can learn from
each other. They can sharpen their understanding of how best to define and to implement important
governmental safeguards.").
97 Id. at 290 (arguing that regulatory redundancy provides an element of protection where one or
the other governments takes an insufficient or inappropriate regulatory action).
98 See infra Part III.B-E. It bears emphasizing that jurisdictional overlap--authority over the
same individual or institution, with regard to the same or related issues-may alone offer some of the
benefits described below. Yet the relevant payoffs are likely to be more episodic, and perhaps more
limited, when dependence is lacking. It is such dependence that demands the patterns of engagement
that underlay the below enumeration. It is in the combination of overlap and dependence that
intersystemic regulation becomes especially valuable, thus, and in increasing dependence that it reaches
its acme, in dialectical regulation.
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the quality of regulatory matching. 99 Second, they may serve a fail-safe
function, minimizing the prospect that desirable regulation will fail to be
adopted or enforced. Third, the phenomena of overlap and dependence,
and resulting patterns of intersystemic regulation, may be an effective
means to encourage innovation. Finally, these elements may serve to
facilitate a degree of integration across systems.100
A. Acknowledging Identity
Much of the pressure on the SEC to include other regulatory agencies in
its work has arisen from the changing nature of the global financial markets
and their participants. Between 1990 and 1999, the number of U.S.
depository receipt programs allowing foreign corporations to trade indirectly
on U.S. exchanges rose from 352 to 1,800.101 The number of countries
participating in such programs grew from twenty-four to seventy-eight.1
0 2
Represented foreign corporations had a market capitalization of more than
$6 trillion.10 3 Direct listings of foreign corporations on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ grew from 170 in 1990 to 750 in 2000.'04 Given
the foregoing, the subjects of U.S. securities law look dramatically different
today than seventy-five, or even twenty-five, years ago. 10 5
Most simply, the SEC's regulatory obligations now extend to an array
of foreign individuals and entities. 0 6  Such regulation of foreign subjects
itself poses significant regulatory challenges. Additionally, however,
global financial markets are increasingly populated by individuals and
entities with multiple, overlapping identities. 10 7  Rather than distinctly
foreign or domestic, they are exceedingly complex regulatory subjects,
99 See Esty, supra note 6, at 1524 n.88 (defining the matching principle as "governance and the
provision of public goods by authorities at a geographic scale that encompasses substantially all cost
bearers and beneficiaries of the policy in question, but [is] no broader").
100 Intersystemic regulation is not, of course, the only institutional scheme suited to promote these
ends. To the contrary, an array of other regulatory arrangements--from regulatory cooperation to
regulatory competition--may advance them. The jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence of
intersystemic regulation, however, may be especially effective in this regard.
101 Coffee, supra note 57, at 1770.
102 Id.
103 id.
104 Id.; see also Concept Release, Request for Comments, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 34-38672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,485, 30,488 n.8 (June 4, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (citing
foreign company listings on the NYSE as increasing from 106 in 1991 to 290 at the end of 1996, and on
the NASDAQ as increasing from 185 in 1991 to 320 at the end of 1996).
10s See Moon, supra note 55, at 153-54.
106 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Office of Int'l Affairs Home Page, http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oia.htm (last visited March 24, 2006) (noting that, as part of the SEC's investor protection
mandate, the Office of International Affairs analyzes the effect of SEC rules on foreign participants,
takes part in the regulation of "globally-active" market participants, advises on and assists in cross-
border securities investigations, and provides training for foreign regulators).
107 See Moon, supra note 55, at 153-56 & n.26, 167 (discussing globalization of the securities
market and multiple forms of cross-border order flow).
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with an array of loyalties and ties shaping their "identity." A modem
public corporation may produce goods in wholly owned facilities in China,
market them in Latin America, be incorporated in Germany, be cross-listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, be
subject to' majority control by American shareholders, and have a
collection ,of officers and board members variously comprised of U.S.,
German, and English nationals.
This is the world of Paul Berman's "cosmopolitan pluralism."' 08  In
Berman's conception, such an entity cannot fairly be conceived as the
exclusive, or even primary, creature of any single jurisdiction. Rather, it is
at once U.S., German, and Chinese, among other things.'09  Such
cosmopolitan subjects, with their multiple identities, are best regulated by a
pluralist. regulatory regime, with its multiple regulatory authorities. A
holistic appreciation of such a corporation, and its effective regulation, may
require a regulatory regime suited to multiplicity and complexity." 0 In the
case of the SEC, by making room for intersystemic regulation, the SEC
may be able to more effectively appreciate, and regulate, such entities as a
cohesive whole. Regulatory balkanization, by contrast, may produce
piecemeal and ineffective regulation.
Without some intersystemic dynamic, then, the United States would
regulate our hypothetical corporation's stock listing, while Germany would
determine its corporate structure and China would have primary
responsibility for its production. Because no regulatory system captures
the entity generally, the collective corpus of regulation is, at a minimum,
likely to impose a suboptimal degree of regulatory constraint. Yet it could
even make things worse. Michael Kang has posited a paradigm of
"hydraulics" in the regulation of election financing; whenever one means
of financing is foreclosed, other ways are found to pursue the same ends."'
One might imagine a similar dynamic in the regulation of individuals and
institutions with multiple sources of identity. Fragmented regulation
imposed by multiple regulators may variously push and pull such subjects
of regulation in different directions, producing greater distortion and
regulatory evasion in their individual behavior and institutional design.
Of course, it is not universally true that individuals and institutions have
complex, cross-jurisdictional identities. Further, as I discuss below, there are
indisputable costs to overlapping regulation and regulatory dependence--
108 See Berman, Globalization, supra note 87, at 321-22.
'0' See id. at 322.
110 Cf id. (advocating a similar approach for courts and envisioning, under a cosmopolitan
pluralist approach to community, the ability of a court in one country to appropriately assert jurisdiction
over a dispute in another country, despite insufficient contacts with that country under a territorial
approach to jurisdiction).
111 Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 134
(2005).
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and risks-such that an indiscriminate embrace of intersystemic regulation is
inadvisable. 1 2  Where the underlying character of relevant subjects of
regulation favor it, however, intersystemic regulation may be useful. Some
integration of the efforts of relevant regulatory entities-driven by the
presence of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence-may offer a
greater prospect of effectively capturing the true nature of the -subjects of
regulation." 3 If the universe of regulated entities with identities extending
across jurisdictional lines is growing, moreover, increased use of
intersystemic regulation may be in order.'14
B. Overcoming Inertia
By all accounts, the aggressive enforcement activities of Eliot Spitzer
in recent years helped to prompt SEC regulation on a number of fronts." 15
Perhaps most notable was the shift away from limited federal regulation of
coflicts between the interests of stock analysts' clients and the
underwriting interests of the analysts' employer banks." 6 To similar effect
was the expansion in the SEC's previously limited regulation of mutual
fund management companies."17
In each of these cases, initial investigations or filings by Spitzer
triggered SEC action. In April 2002, Spitzer highlighted research analysts'
conflicting incentives, given their clients' interest in sound counsel and
their investment banking colleagues' interest in underwriting business." 8
As Spitzer's investigation gained steam, the SEC unexpectedly introduced
Regulation AC, requiring analysts to certify the truthfulness of the views
expressed in their research reports and public appearances. 19 Thereafter,
the SEC also agreed to join Spitzer's Global Research Analyst
"
2 See infra Part III.E.
113 As noted above, this analysis echoes Esty's concept of "mismatched" regulation, in which the
scope of the relevant regulatory issues does not match the jurisdictional reach of relevant regulatory
agencies. See Esty, supra note 12, at 587-90, 647-48.
114 Naturally, one might challenge the actual incidence of complex identities among regulated
entities. A more nuanced challenge might suggest that such cases can be adequately managed without
any structured pattern of intersystemic regulation. At some level, I would not dispute as much. Where
particular cases can be effectively managed, the greater complexity of intersystemic regulation is likely
inadvisable. Unless the claim is that there are never circumstances in which the recurrence of a
particular issue might cause the benefits of a standard approach to outweigh its costs, however, the
more effective acknowledgement of identity remains a potential benefit of intersystemic regulation.
115 See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
16 See Jill E. Fisch, Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 617, 620 & n.7 (2005); see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y
Gen. Eliot Spitzer, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators
Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20b 02.html.
"7 See Fisch, supra note 116, at 620.
"8Id
19 William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMoRy L.J. 843, 965-66 (2005).
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Settlement. 12  As to the mutual fund industry, Spitzer called attention to
companies' common engagement in "market timing" and "late trading"
practices, both illegal.121 Thereafter, the SEC adopted new regulations,
requiring investment companies to appoint a chief compliance officer and
maintain certain official records beyond their prior obligations. 122 Further,
the SEC initiated a number of its own enforcement actions against
management companies engaged in such practices. 12
3
Similar patterns have played out transnationally. While the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 lacked any explicit proscription against insider
trading, such a bar was subsequently read into the antifraud rules of
Section 10(b).124  In major financial markets outside the United States,
however, insider trading long remained permissible. 25 As financial markets
grew more global, this divergence proved increasingly problematic for the
SEC. Insider trading could be conducted with relative impunity overseas.
The SEC has sought to respond to this predicament with progressive efforts
to extend the reach of U.S. regulatory standards overseas. Early on, the SEC
relied on relatively unilateral approaches to overseas enforcement. 126 With
time, however, it came to favor the adoption of bilateral agreements in one of
two forms-memoranda of understanding and mutual legal assistance
treaties. 127 Under such agreements, the SEC could engage more actively and
effectively with their overseas counterparts in securing discovery, identifying
and engaging witnesses, and otherwise enforcing relevant procedural and
substantive rules.' 28 Additionally, the SEC pursued the adoption of U.S.
legislation strengthening its capacity for overseas enforcement.1
29
Ultimately, the procedural limits of these tools, as well as the continued
concerns they engendered among foreign regulators, demanded a further
step. In recent years, the SEC has promoted introduction of insider trading
laws in major financial markets across the globe.' 30 Working with foreign
legislative and administrative officials, the SEC involved itself in the
120 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, supra note 116.
121 Fisch, supra note 116, at 620.
122 Compliance Procedures and Practices of Certain Investment Companies, 17C.F.R.
§ 270.38a-1 (2004).
123 Steven T. Taylor, New Cost-Saving Compliance Product Great for Clients, Better for Reed
Smith, OF COUNSEL, Jul. 2005, at 3. On the general role of federal-state jurisdictional overlap in
overcoming inertia in securities law, see Di Trolio, supra note 9, at 1304-05.
124 Roe, supra note 21, at 611 n.73.
125 See Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the
Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 189-90 (1995).
126 James A. Kehoe, Recent Development, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of
U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345, 358 (1995).
121 Id. at 359-69.
128 Id. at 359-63.
129 1d. at 369-74.
130 Id. at 358.
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drafting and promotion of relevant legislation.' 3' Yet even as these efforts
succeeded, enforcement remained weak.132 Continued U.S. commitment to
the regulation of insider trading activity in foreign markets, and engagement
with their overseas counterparts to this effect, however, has ultimately helped
to encourage more rigorous foreign enforcement of the new rules.
133
In these respective domestic and transnational cases, regulatory
engagement across jurisdictional lines might be seen as a "fail-safe"
mechanism of sorts. Originally arising in the field of cybernetics, fail-safe
systems of redundancy are designed to ensure achievement of desired
outcomes, notwithstanding the failure of any single component in a given
system. 134  They offer a back-up, given the inevitable prospect of some
degree of failure. With time, such fail-safe conceptions of redundancy
have found application in various non-technological fields, from the nature
of industrial production in the context of international trade 35 to the design
of criminal sentencing schemes.
136
Robert Cover saw some such fail-safe function as the backdrop for his
analysis of jurisdictional redundancy between federal and state courts. 137 In
particular, both the interest and ideology elements of his analysis rely on a
certain fail-safe redundancy. 138  Similarly, Robert Schapiro identifies
redundancy as a benefit of his "interactive federalism."' 39 The availability of
alternative federal and state remedies in any number of situations-from the
securities laws to Section 1983's civil rights remedies, 140  and from
constitutional rights to the authorization of civil suits under the Violence
131 William J. Carney, Introduction, Business Law: The Impact of Competition on Regulation,
52 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1293 n.31 (2003).
132 See id.
133 See id at 1293.
134 See Matthew Tuchband, Note, The Systematic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade:
A Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2111 (1995).
131 See id. at 2110-11.
136 See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REv. 175, 193-94
(2005); see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 30-31 (1987). A distinct but related
benefit of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence may be their capacity to minimize the
consequences of regulatory capture. In essence, if particular interest groups are more likely to enjoy
influence at one level of government, intersystemic regulation may facilitate greater representation-or
at least balance-in the regulatory process. See Esty, supra note 12, at 604. Thus, in corporate law,
management interests may be more influential in Delaware, while investors' voices may be better heard
in Washington. See Jones, supra note 20, at 636-37. To related effect, overlapping regulatory
authority may reduce regulatory externalities. See Esty, supra note 12, at 573, 647-48. At a minimum,
multiple layers of regulation can be expected to increase the costs of regulatory capture. See Jones,
supra note 28, at 122, 124.
137 See Cover, supra note 82, at 650-52.
138 See id. at 649.
139 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 288-89 (suggesting that "[t]he overlap of federal and state
authority" provides additional legal protection).
40 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Against Women Act 4 1--- can help ensure that relevant rights and privileges
are effectively protected. 142  Paul Berman's cosmopolitan pluralism might
also be seen to echo this notion, in its effort to define jurisdiction such that, it
does not go unexercised in cases in which community ties warrant its
imposition.
43
Some pattern of regulatory engagement between the SEC and both
state officials and foreign and transnational market regulators may play a
similar role in reducing the prospect of regulatory error. 144  One might
expect, however, that such error-reduction would arise particularly in
reducing the prospect of inertia. One can readily imagine regulatory errors
of both exclusion and inclusion.145 In the former case, regulatory entities
fail to adopt or enforce desirable regulation. In the latter, agencies over-
regulate, subjecting issues or entities to regulation where they would be
better left unregulated.
Regulatory regimes characterized by overlapping jurisdiction and a
degree of dependence are more likely to redress under-regulation than
over-regulation. Most obviously, this follows from the redundancy at
work. If two entities are regulating a given subject, one would naturally
expect some greater prospect of "complete" regulation. More interesting
than this autarkic function, however, is the potential that the recurrent
engagement of intersystemic regulation may prod increased regulation by
each regulatory body.'4 Such an increase is arguably suggested by the
experience of the SEC. The SEC's degree of supervision, monitoring, and
constraint of mutual fund management companies' illegal trading practices,
for example, has not only been supplemented by the enforcement efforts of
Eliot Spitzer, but has increased on account of the latter. Spitzer's
regulatory efforts, in turn, have grown bolder-and perhaps more
comprehensive--with federal involvement.
47
141 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
142 Schapiro, supra note 6, at 289-90. To related effect, Bill Buzbee has spoken of the capacity of
redundancy to minimize the prospect of "regulatory underkill." See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory
Underkill in an Era of Anti-Environmental Majorities, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS
IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005); see also Buzbee, Contextual,
supra note 24, at 114-19 (stating that accuracy can be increased through increased redundancy).
141 See Berman, Globalization, supra note 87, at 490-94.
14 Renee Jones has advocated a pattern of federal-state interaction in corporate law that is to just
this effect. In her view, regulatory overlap may serve to address inaction at either the federal or state
level. See Jones, supra note 20, at 644-46. By way of example, she describes the Delaware courts'
seeming "response" to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See id.
145 Cf Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV.. L. REv. 1429, 1450 (2001) (illustrating the over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness of preventive detention).
146 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2080-81.
147 See Fisch, supra note 116, at 620. Spitzer's -willingness to demand far-reaching structural
reforms at the numerous large brokerage firms implicated in his investigation of conflicts of interest in
investment counseling might thus be tied to his recruitment of the SEC to join in his settlements with
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In part, this may be the salutary result of regulatory competition.148 Jill
Fisch identifies numerous areas in which federal and state officials
compete to regulate corporate governance. 49  In Spitzer's case, state
litigation may be an important node of competition over areas in which
federal regulation has been limited.150  Beyond regulatory competition,
however, recurrently interacting agencies may also be driven to pursue
more active regulation through adaptive learning from one another. Thus,
regulatory engagement may produce regulation going well beyond a given
agency's initiatives to date.15 ' The expansion in SEC actions against
mutual fund management companies can be seen in this light. The
introduction and effective enforcement of insider trading rules in foreign
jurisdictions may also evidence interactive learning.
I do not wish to suggest that intersystemic regulation cannot reduce
errors of inclusion as well. Regulatory competition is understood to cut
both ways, at least occasionally deterring regulation or even inducing
deregulation.15 2  For the most part, however, it is fair to assume that the
jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence present in intersystemic
regulation will address the inertia of failures to regulate more thoroughly
than it will constrain patterns of over-regulation. Given as much, it is
necessary to acknowledge the danger that intersystemic regulation may
serve as the handmaiden of over-regulation.15 3  This danger is readily
appreciated in a framework of regulatory competition. In agencies'
competition for legislative appropriations, over-regulation may be more
the firms. See Ide, supra note 34, at 831 n. 16 (citing Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen.
Eliot Spitzer, supra note 34).
:48 See Esty, supra note 6, at 1556-57.
49 See Fisch, supra note 116, at 619-23.
150 Id. at 621-22.
"' Information consolidation and enhanced expertise have been identified as aspects of this result
in collaborative environmental regulation. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 219-20. The potential for
learning within groups might also be noted. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm
Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 254 (2005).
1352 The role of "veto players," as analyzed in the political science literature, may be one important
element in this result. See Josephine T. Andrews & Gabriella R. Montinola, Veto Players and the Rule
of Law in Emerging Democracies, 37 COMP. POL. STuD. 55 (2004), available at http://cps.sagepub.
com/content/vo137/issuel. To similar effect is the analysis of William Fischel, see WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 251-52 (1995), and James
Buchanan and Yong Yoon, see James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11-12 (2000), as well as Michael Heller, see Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 621 (1998). In corporate and securities law, overlapping federal and state regulation of certain
corporate activity, including the use of proxies, might be argued to produce some degree of under-
regulation. Ultimately, the particular mode of regulation in a given case may be determinative of
whether regulatory overlap encourages or discourages inertia. Cf Buzbee, Westway, supra note 24, at
357-58.
153 See Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Toward an Economic Theory of Pro-
Defendant Criminal Procedure (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Papers: Discussion Paper
No. 318, 2001), available at http://www.harvard.law.edu/programs/olinSfcenter/papers/pdf/318.pdf;
see also Stephan, supra note 16, at 208.
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likely to elicit largesse than under-regulation. 15 4
In corporate law, the claim of a "race-to-the-top" posits that regulatory
competition will produce an optimal regulatory balance.' 55 The feedback
mechanism at work in corporate law, however, may be distinct from that at
work in regulatory competition generally. In corporate law, over-regulation
is discouraged by the penalty of out-of-state reincorporations and elections
not to incorporate within the state. 156  Where both the source and the
mechanism of inter-jurisdictional reward and punishment is less visible and
direct than in corporate law, we may not see the same patterns of
competition. Rather, a one-way competitive ratchet may commonly favor
more, and rarely less, regulation.
Besides acknowledging the complex identity of regulated subjects, then,
intersystemic regulation may minimize regulatory inertia, through patterns of
regulatory competition and learning. This role may be especially important
amidst transition. When financial markets are globalizing or otherwise
changing at a rapid pace, by way of example, the prospect of under-
regulation and regulatory gaps may be especially significant.
C. Encouraging Innovation
A rapidly changing marketplace also requires a capacity for regulatory
reform. Modem regulatory regimes thus demand mechanisms of innovation
and evolution. 157 In the SEC context, this may be most evident in the SEC's
work with foreign national regulators, as well as IOSCO and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), to develop generally
applicable international accounting standards' 58  Such standards are
increasingly necessary, given the aforementioned patterns of transnational
market activity, including the growth in cross-listings. 59 The SEC has thus
been compelled to work more actively with its overseas counterparts to
develop a common accounting regime imposing consistent rules across
jurisdictional boundaries. 160 The SEC's efforts to introduce insider trading
rules in European jurisdictions can be understood in a similar light.16'
154 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 30-32; cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation:
The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW.
447,466 (1995).
155 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
156 Id. at 252-53.
157 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2123-24. Hinting at the role of intersystemic regulation in
promoting innovation, Bill Buzbee has spoken of a "learning function" of regulatory overlap. See
Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24, at 122-25.
... Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 931, 949-50 (2002).
159 See Coffee, supra note 57, at 1770-71.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.161 See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
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Domestically, one might characterize the SEC's decision to more
forcefully regulate research analysts and mutual fund management
companies as another case of innovation. Eliot Spitzer's enforcement
efforts, in essence, forced the SEC to develop new rules to better capture
extant patterns of market activity. The SEC's promulgation of
Regulation AC, requiring certification of the truthfulness of views expressed
in research reports and in public appearances, is but one example.1
62
Cover sees such innovation as a significant benefit of the jurisdictional
redundancy enshrined within the United States's dual judicial system.' 63 He
and Aleinikoff point to innovation in the criminal procedure jurisprudence of
the Warren Court by way of example. 164 In their account, the interaction of
state courts enforcing state criminal law, and lower federal courts engaged in
federal constitutional analysis of convictions on habeas review, encouraged
the development of new legal norms. 165  The state courts' "pragmatic"
perspective, the federal courts' "utopian" perspective, and each system's
need at least to engage, and even offer some deference to, the other, resulted
in cross-pollination, learning, and legal evolution.'
66
Schapiro also highlights the capacity for regulatory innovation, with his
suggestion of the utility of interactive federalism as the source of a plurality
of regulatory approaches, and as a mechanism of dialogue. 67 Overlapping
federal and state jurisdiction may thus give rise to "multiple approaches to a
particular problem," such as environmental protection or workplace safety,
driven by distinct institutional or geographic perspectives.1 68  Further, such
overlap may help to encourage a productive dialogue, in which federal and
state regulatory institutions learn from one another. 169  Minimally, the
contribution of one entity may constitute a dissent from the predominant will
of the other. 170  Plurality and any resulting dialogue are thus the warp and
woof of the pursuit of regulatory innovation. With these features,
overlapping regulatory regimes may encourage optimal legal evolution.
I have previously highlighted the potential role of intersystemic judicial
162 See Fisher, supra note 44, at 965.
163 See Cover, supra note 82, at 672-73.
64 See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 22.
165 See id. at 1049-50.
'66 See id. at 1050-51. As I argue in greater detail below, see infra Part V.C, the shared legal and
regulatory culture present in the interaction of federal and state courts studied by Cover and Aleinikoff
is likely important in producing innovation. In the broader universe of interactions I consider under the
heading of intersystemic regulation, some commonality of perspective is also likely to be essential.
167 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 288.
168 Id.
169 Schapiro points to the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence from Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), as suggestive of such
learning. Schapiro, supra note 6, at 288-89; see also de Brca, supra note 13, at 824 (discussing
"mutual learning" from regulatory overlap).
170 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 289 (suggesting that states may symbolically enact legislation
that is preempted by federal law but serves as an official statement of disagreement).
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interaction in fostering innovation, particularly in the development of
international norms of due process. '7  In that context, I suggested the
potential for path dependence to constrain the evolution of judicial norms
within any single judicial system. 72 Yet such path dependence is not unique
to judicial norms. 173 Regulation generally might be expected to favor existing
norms over alternative approaches. 74  If this is so, then intersystemic
regulation and other institutional mechanisms designed to encourage
innovation may serve as a beneficial corrective.
Intersystemic regulation may help to facilitate innovation in several
ways, most simply, by incorporating the alternative perspectives of
distinctly situated regulatory entities.1 75  Such differences in perspective
may arise from institutional design, national or international context, and
sources of authority, among other factors. 176  Whatever the source,
distinctly situated agencies may encourage regulatory innovation, simply
by offering each other something new. Eliot Spitzer's more aggressive
pursuit of research analysts and mutual fund management companies might
thus have derived from his political orientation as an elected state official
or from some other motivation favoring stronger investor protection. The
SEC's participation in the evolution of international accounting standards
involves a similar clash-and synthesis--of distinct perspectives. 1
77
Beyond its integration of distinct perspectives, intersystemic regulation
furthers innovation because neither regulatory body can foreclose the
relevant engagement and dialogue in an untimely fashion. 78  Within a
single, hierarchical system, or across systems lacking regulatory dependence,
by contrast, engagement and resulting innovation will likely be more limited.
To slightly different effect, intersystemic regulation may also
encourage innovation, and perhaps optimal policy outcomes, through its
enhancement of the quality of available information. 79  By pooling the
171 See generally Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2123-39.
172 See id. at 2064-68.
173 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974) (observing path dependence in a variety of intellectual tasks).
174 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 33-34 (discussing the "status quo bias"). In fact, path
dependence may be even stronger outside the judicial context than within it.
175 See Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24, at 121-22 ("Similarly, parallel, overlapping, and
cooperative regulatory federalism structures can offer opportunities for innovation, copying of
regulatory 'templates,' incremental improvement, and local tailoring of national goals."); de la Porte,
supra note 24, at 39 (arguing that the coordination approach of the EU works to achieve common
objectives while respecting divergent values).
:76 See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Analogous patterns of innovation have been
observed in corporate law. See generally Jones, supra note 20.
178 A distinct, but related, contribution of overlapping regulatory authority may be a heightened
potential to encourage the engagement and involvement of relevant constituencies. In essence, by
providing additional nodes for engagement, and perhaps a more dynamic dimension to regulation of a
particular subject, the cumulative involvement of interested individuals and entities may grow.
179 See Jones, supra note 28, at 119.
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resources and capacities needed for information collection and analysis,
thus,. regulatory engagement can improve decision-making.1 80  .Notably,
this has been an important factor in calls for cross-jurisdictional
coordination in environmental regulation.! '
To be sure, any value of intersystemic regulation as a source of
regulatory innovation must be tempered against the risks of "innovation" in
the form of regulatory excess. Relevant innovation may also come at the
expense of democratic accountability and legitimacy.18 2 We can appreciate
these possibilities in the interaction of Spitzer and the SEC. Rather than a
case of desirable innovation, one might alternatively see their interaction as
a cautionary tale of regulatory capture: A politically motivated attorney
general, his sights set on the governor's mansion,18 3 forces the SEC to
abandon its longstanding, optimal decision to limit the regulation of certain
industries. In this account, innovation remains at the center; the normative
dimension of the tale, however, is dramatically different.
Transnationally, this negative story of innovation may be even more
relevant. From a U.S. perspective, the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System
and the broader pursuit of international accounting standards might arguably
be seen as an erosion of United States disclosure and accounting standards,
resulting in diminished protection of U.S. investors. 8 4 From the perspective
Is0 Cf Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 748-50 (1999) (noting potential mechanisms of legal reform
through the unification and harmonization of law). At a minimum, it will increase the available pool of
resources. See Jones, supra note 28, at 124-25.
... See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 219-20. An element of both the democratic
experimentalism and new governance literatures is "the periodic pooling of information ... to reveal
the defects of parochial solutions, ... allow[] for the elaboration of standards for comparing local
achievements. . . [and] expose[] poor performers to criticism from within and without, making good
ones (temporary) models for emulation." Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 17.
182 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1996-1997) (analyzing how accountability constraints, or
the lack thereof, influence the behavior of international lawmaking bodies).
183 Cf Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24, at 108.
184 See Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 81-82, 85 (2001); see also Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street:
A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV.
649, 663 n.76 (1995) (stating that the system has "achieved only limited success"). Paul Stephan's
public choice analysis of the agency costs of international cooperation in competition policy is
suggestive. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 198-99; see also id. at 202-03 (arguing that political
differences between the legislative and executive branches of government tend to result in standardless
harmonization agreements). Presumptions of public mindedness are surely no more justified with
reference to international regulators or national regulators engaged in transnational coordination, than
with reference to regulators acting in a purely domestic capacity. Potentially greater monitoring costs,
meanwhile, may make such self-interested conduct more difficult to control in the former cases. In a
regime of intersystemic regulation, however, as opposed to a truly international regime, such costs may
not necessarily be elevated. This may be true, among other reasons, given the relatively greater degree
of institutional flexibility in an intersystemic, rather than international, regulatory regime. See id. at
203 (discussing the general inflexibility of "[flaw-based international institutions"). Given as much,
the dangers of regulatory innovation may at least be no greater with reference to intersystemic
regulation, than ordinary domestic regulation.
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of European regulators, meanwhile, the imposition of insider trading
regulation, in the face of pressure from the United States, might be seen as
similarly sub-optimal.
18 5
Such arguments do not obviate the potential utility of intersystemic
regulation in fostering an optimal degree of regulatory innovation. They
suggest, however, that regulatory change need not, and perhaps ought not,
be equated with progress. Given as much, careful attention to the
particular products of intersystemic regulatory interactions is essential.
D. Facilitating Integration
The SEC's efforts to cooperate with foreign and transnational
regulators to develop a shared set of accounting standards highlight the
final potential contribution of intersystemic regulation-the facilitation of
integration. Through such engagements, regulatory institutions across the
globe have sought to articulate accounting standards applicable to the
financial markets generally. Because of the increasingly integrated nature
of such markets, some integration in standards is likely essential.
8 6
The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System in place between Canada
and the United States similarly facilitates integration. In essence, the
mutual recognition regime of the MJDS outlines a shared set of disclosure
requirements sufficient to meet the regulatory needs of each participant.
187
If that common standard is fulfilled, any demand for re-registration in the
alternative jurisdiction is necessarily redundant. Under the MJDS, thus,
stock issuances in either jurisdiction are marketable in the other.'88
Milder forms of integration can also be identified. In the foregoing
cases, the common standards operate as both a minimum requirement and a
maximum imposition. Thus, if accounting standards are met in one
jurisdiction, no further regulatory demands can be imposed. However, in
the SEC's efforts to promote insider trading regulation in Europe, the
integration involved only a minimum threshold. European regulators have
imposed some minimum insider trading rules. 189 Yet the presence of such
185 See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the
International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200 (1992) ("[I]f the
current attitude in the United States is that those found guilty of insider trading should be left 'naked,
homeless, and without wheels,' many [European] countries appear to view the practice as meriting no
more than a stiff warning, akin to a traffic ticket.").
186 See generally Moon, supra note 55 (calling for the implementation of an integrated global
securities market).
187 See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, The Multyurisdictional Disclosure
System and Other Cross-Border Offerings, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 551 (1992) (discussing the
requirements of the MJDS).
'8 See id. at 551; see also Anna T. Drummond, Securities Law Internationalization of Securities
Regulation-Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canada and the U.S., 36 VILL. L. REV. 775,
789-90(1991).
189 Caroline A.A. Greene, Note, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances in
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minimum requirements does not prevent the United States from
prosecuting a wider array of conduct.
Paul Berman expressly eschews a commitment to integration in his
cosmopolitan pluralism. 190 It is not clear, however, that his view deviates
significantly from my citation of integration as a benefit of intersystemic
regulation. Any integration resulting from overlapping and dependent
regulatory regimes need not involve complete integration and the attendant
elimination of diversity. In fact, the latter might be seen as contrary to the
very dynamic of intersystemic regulation.' 91 Instead, the present analysis
posits intersystemic regulation as helping to facilitate the optimal degree of
integration in a given case, whatever that might be.
Some such notion appears to be in the background of Cover's and
Schapiro's analyses as well. Each sees the interaction between federal and
state judicial systems as a source of at least some harmonization in standards,
procedural approaches, or the like. Cover's conception of redundancy in
constitutional criminal procedure aspires to some ultimate integration of
federal and state perspectives in a shared constitutional norm. 92 Schapiro's
identification of dialogue as a function of interactive federalism, meanwhile,
seemingly points toward a closer alignment of intersystemic norms. 93
Neither Cover nor Schapiro, however, seeks comprehensive integration.
To be sure, we should not underestimate the potential of intersystemic
regulation to facilitate significant integration, whether for better or
worse. 194  In the context of interactions between international arbitral
tribunals formed under NAFTA and domestic courts in the United States, I
have offered a relatively strong conception of integration in international
norms of due process. 95 Even there, I do not suggest a "harmonization" or
"unification" of law. Nonetheless, such norms may well come to exhibit a
significant degree of consistency, by way of judicial interaction. 196
Assistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 637 n.9 (1994).
190 Berman, Globalization, supra note 87, at 397-400.191 With complete integration, the divergence of perspectives that contributes to a fruitful pattern
of engagement is necessarily diminished, if not eliminated.
192 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 1036.
193 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 288.
194 Paul Stephan has questioned the wisdom, as well as the feasibility, of analogous efforts at
international integration of antitrust rules. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 198-99; see also Stephan,
supra note 180 (expressing skepticism of efforts directed at harmonizing international law). At least
some of Stephan's public choice criticisms of international integration, however, may be addressed
within a paradigm of intersystemic regulation. While issues of accountability undoubtedly arise with
such engagement, see supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text, domestic mechanisms of
accountability retain greater force in a regime integrated through intersystemic regulation, rather than
through patterns of international harmonization and institutionalization of legal regimes.
195 See generally Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2123-39.
196 See id. at 2139 (characterizing dialectical interaction as a "complex process ... whereby
international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal and
political processes") (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,
205 (1996)).
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The results of an interaction among courts, however, might reasonably
be expected to be distinct from the fruit of any engagement among other
regulatory institutions. The distinct-and likely less consistent-
institutional designs and procedural approaches in play beyond.the courts
might be expected to stymie patterns of integration.1 97 Further, legislative
and executive officials, who are less removed than courts from local
politics and preferences, may more strongly resist integration. While
comprehensive integration may be a possibility, then, it is not likely to be
the ordinary result of intersystemic regulation. Rather, selective patterns of
integration may be the norm.
198
Regardless of degree, intersystemic regulation is likely to be an
effective mechanism of integration. 99 Regulatory interaction offers an
effective mechanism for gradual, incremental shifts in law and norms,
rather than catastrophic changes.200  Further, it allows more room for
evolution in the common norm, such that the ultimate deviation from the
prevailing standard in each relevant jurisdiction may be minimized. Thus,
intersystemic regulation may permit characterization of any integration as
the development of a new standard, rather than one participant's adoption
of the existing standard of another. Finally, integration driven by
intersystemic regulation may be more susceptible to marginal
modifications and adjustments than other, perhaps more deterministic,
mechanisms of integration.20'
E. The Costs of Intersystemic Regulation
Beyond the aforementioned concerns particular to each of the potential
benefits of overlap and dependence, and of resulting intersystemic
regulation, regulatory engagement across jurisdictional lines may also raise
certain general concerns. To begin with, it is important to acknowledge the
costs of regulatory overlap-in both dollars and legal certainty.
Additionally, regulatory shirking and related patterns of neglect may be
significant dangers of intersystemic regulation. Finally, there are the
political costs of intersystemic regulation.
'9' See id. at 2066-68.
198 Notably, an overly high degree of integration might cut against the functions of intersystemic
regulation as a fail-safe remedy to regulatory inertia and as a source of innovation. See supra
Part III.B-C. The greater the degree of alignment across relevant regulatory entities, thus, the lesser the
likely capacity of the collective system to redress inaction by either agency and, even more clearly, to
offer meaningful variety and innovation.
M9 See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 220 (noting "common set of understandings" born of
collaborative regulation). The open method of coordination in Europe might similarly be understood as
a mechanism of integration. See de Bfirca, supra note 13, at 816, 825; de la Porte, supra note 24, at 39.
200 An informational perspective is central to "new governance" conceptions of such integration.
See, e.g., Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 8-9.
201 See Stephan, supra note 16, at 203 (arguing that the unanimity requirement in altering
international institutions causes inflexibility).
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The regulatory overlap underpinning intersystemic regulation is
inherently costly. By charging a pair of regulators with the authority and
responsibility to regulate a given subject matter or entity, one necessarily
multiplies the cumulative cost of regulation.20 2 Redundancy has its costs.
20 3
Of course, the utility of redundancy may outweigh such costs. Nonetheless,
they should be acknowledged in any election of overlap and dependence
over the elimination of redundancy through effective line-drawing.
Another cost of intersystemic regulation is the loss of certainty that is
attendant to it. Much of the appeal of the law's conventional project of
jurisdictional line-drawing, described at the outset, lies in its enhancement
of legal certainty.2° In law, as elsewhere, good fences may make good
neighbors. They may not, however, make good law. Ultimately, degree is
likely to be everything. While a refined scheme of intersystemic regulation
might offer the right balance of complexity and certainty, the danger lies in
flawed schemes, with too much complexity, and consequently too little
certainty.
Regulatory "shirking" and its analogues might be seen as further costs
of intersystemic regulation.20 5  In the mildest potential critique,
intersystemic regulation might be seen to diminish the quality of oversight.206
While two heads may be better than one on numerous counts, two sets of
eyes may also be less cautious than one.20 7 Experimental psychologists
thus observe a tendency toward diminished oversight and engagement.by
individuals within groups. 208  Similarly, in the presence of multiple
regulators, some free-riding on the expected contributions of one's
counterpart agency may be likely.20 9 While the net degree of oversight
might be expected to be greater in the ordinary case of intersystemic
202 See Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24, at 127.
203 Cf Cover, supra note 82, at 654 n.5 1.
204 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
205 See Ahdieh, supra note 151, at 254 n.87 (discussing the phenomenon of "social loafing");
Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 225 (hypothesizing the lack of accountability absent an identifiable
decision-maker).
206 Ahdieh, supra note 151, at 253; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 530 (2002).
207 See Ahdieh, supra note 151, at 254 n.87 (explaining potentially negative consequences of
group decision-making).
200 See generally Michael Diehl & Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss in Brainstorming
Groups: Toward the Solution of a Riddle, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 497 (1987).
209 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 17-18; cf Alan A. Altshuler & Robert W. Curry, The Changing
Environment of Urban Development Policy: Shared Power or Shared Impotence, 10 URB. L. ANN. 3,
40 (1975) (arguing that the proliferation of veto votes among interested parties leads to inaction where
any one party's interests may be adversely affected). Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier suggest a
distinct, but related, point. Intertwined legal regimes may engender significant regulatory complexity
and thereby undermine effective regulatory decision-making. See generally Karen J. Alter & Sophie
Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 362 (2006) (suggesting that nesting and overlapping international regimes may stymie public
decision-making).
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regulation, thus, sufficient free-riding in any particular case could produce
a net decline. More affirmatively, regulatory agencies may directly rely on
the presence of multiple regulators as a basis to avoid their legal
obligations.21 ° With someone else to blame, each agency loses its incentive
to get it right.211 In the event of failure, one's regulatory "partner" can
always be stuck with the blame.
Finally, one might emphasize the above costs in the political terms of
democratic accountability and regulatory authority. In its abandonment of
clear lines of jurisdiction and authority, intersystemic regulation
necessarily challenges certain traditional notions of democratic constraint.
Where regulatory institutions are dependent on counterparts beyond the
reach of their formal and even informal constituencies, the politics of
regulation grow more complex, and problematic.212 On the other hand,
intersystemic regulation might also be seen to enhance political legitimacy in
appropriate cases, through its heightened capacity for more efficient capture
and accommodation of relevant externalities.213
Naturally, cognizance of the costs and risks of intersystemic regulation is
critical to the project of regulatory design to which this analysis ultimately
speaks. One might well attempt to address the latter issues through such
institutional design, including through the incorporation of some mechanism
of joint accounting across relevant jurisdictional lines or some instrument of
external oversight. Additionally, we do well to recall the "fail-safe"
functions of jurisdictional overlap, regulatory dependence, and intersystemic
regulation.214 The latter naturally cut against some of the regulatory shirking
concerns noted above. While intersystemic regulation may give rise to
certain "regulatory commons" and other problems, then, these may
ultimately be outweighed by the countervailing benefits of such a regime.
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF INTERSYSTEMIC REGULATION
As defined herein, intersystemic regulation encompasses more than
any single pattern of regulatory engagement across jurisdictional lines.
Rather, an array of interactions-distinct in the degree of dependence and
the valence of the relationship, among other factors-is encompassed within
the universe of intersystemic regulation.
Intersystemic regulation does not, however, encompass the entire
210 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 44 n.158, 49-51 & n. 191.
211 Id. at 30-31.
212 This may be even more true in regulatory interactions than in the judicial engagements I have
previously studied. See Ahdieh, supra note 22. Given the lesser formality and greater obscurity of
agency action, intersystemic regulation may raise democratic deficits above and beyond those attendant
to overlap and dependence among courts.
23 See Esty, supra note 12, at 587-90.
2 4 See supra Part III.B.
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universe of regulatory interactions across jurisdictional lines. Regulatory
agencies may interact, to begin, even absent any meaningful jurisdictional
overlap-regulatory authority over the same individual or institution, with
regard to the same or related issues. Even once overlap is added to the
equation, interactions lacking a degree of dependence-reliance of at least
one of the relevant agencies on the action or inaction of the other-fall
outside our definition of intersystemic regulation. Finally, interactions
shaped by a strong degree of hierarchy-and analogous circumstances
characterized by dramatic power imbalance-are also outside the universe of
intersystemic regulation. In such cases, the pattern of interaction lacks the
reciprocal dynamic essential to the emergence of intersystemic regulation.
With an eye to further theorizing the nature of intersystemic regulation,
and building on the above parameters, the ensuing discussion attempts to
plot out the types of cross-jurisdictional relationships falling within and
around the universe of intersystemic regulation. Taking jurisdictional
overlap as the baseline predicate and seeking to define relevant interactions
by reference to the dependence at work, it dissects the latter into two
elements: the degree of dependence between the relevant agencies and the
valence of any such dependence. How much dependence is present in the
relationship and to what extent is that dependence more in the nature of
unilateral hierarchy, versus bilateral inter-dependence?
The resulting typology of regulatory interactions offers a spatial
representation of the relations of regulatory entities across jurisdictional
lines. In doing so, it might first be expected to enhance our appreciation of
such interactions. Further, such a typology represents a framework within
which both the architects of and participants in regulatory regimes can
analyze and debate appropriate patterns of interaction. Finally, by mapping
out some typology of the interactions of regulatory entities across
jurisdictional lines, the relative normativity of intersystemic regulation and
its consummation in dialectical regulation can be better understood.
Beyond delineating the broad strokes of a proposed spectrum of
regulatory interactions, the ensuing analysis includes some preliminary
discussion of those aspects of institutional design or extrinsic circumstance
that might variously motivate, facilitate, and even normatively favor one or
another pattern of regulatory interaction across jurisdictional lines-
including particularly those patterns of engagement falling at or closer to the
bounds of our spectrum. While intersystemic regulation is the focus of the
present analysis, I would not argue that it is invariably preferable to other
patterns of engagement; the same is true of dialectical regulation's strong
patterns of interaction. In appropriate circumstances, the hierarchical power
characteristic of one bound of our spectrum and the pure dialogue attendant
to the other may have greater utility. In other cases, more unidirectional or
more dialogic patterns of intersystemic regulation, or strongly dialectical
regulation, may be ideal.
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A. Hierarchy and Dialogue in Regulatory Engagement
In framing the interactions of regulatory institutions across jurisdictional
lines, one might fruitfully define them within a spectrum characterized by
dependence. 21 5 Along the x-axis, one might plot the degree of dependence
in the relevant regulatory relationship. To what extent does the ability of at
least one of the participants to pursue a given regulatory task rely on the
cooperation of the other? From the opposite perspective, to what extent may
the action or inaction of one entity hold up the work of the other?
Along the y-axis, meanwhile, we can attempt to capture what might
variously be termed the reciprocity of any dependence, the equivalence or
parity of power between the relevant agencies, or (in some subset of cases)
the degree of hierarchy in their relationship. To what extent is any
dependence that is present unidirectional versus bilateral in nature? Is one
agency dependent on the other, while the other enjoys significant
independence, placing us low on the y-axis? Or is the dynamic one of
meaningful interdependence, falling higher up on the y-axis?
Within this construct, data points falling on the x-axis are those
characterized by the lowest degree of reciprocity (or highest degree of
hierarchy). 216 In these cases, the pattem of dependence is entirely one-sided.
One agency is completely dependent on the other, while the latter is
essentially independent of the former. Such patterns of interaction are quite
common within jurisdictions, as evident in the supervisory relationship
between home and regional offices of a given administrative agency 217 and
in the authority of appellate courts over trial courts.218
Such hierarchy is less likely to be found across jurisdictional lines.
Federal power to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause may be a
notable exception.2 19 The constitutional authority of the federal government
is constructed to permit issuance of federal regulatory mandates with
intersystemic effect. 220  In securities law, for example, one might note the
215 Beyond the plotting of two dimensions of dependence presented below, one might potentially
incorporate a third axis capturing the extent ofjurisdictional overlap between relevant agencies. This is
a project for another day.
216 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2045-49 (describing the nature of appellate review).
217 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17-22 (5th ed. 2003) (outlining
distribution of power within a typical government agency).
218 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817, 823-25 (1994).219 See U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421-22 (1964).
220 Even the federal power of preemption is limited, however, given some constitutional limit on
the scope of federal legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that
the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with authority to enact a civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 exceeded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause because it
neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the relevant gun possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce). Beyond the constitutional limits on preemption,
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selective preemptions of state securities law by the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996221 and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998.222 With this legislation, state securities law was
abruptly contracted, by federal fiat.
Points falling on the y-axis, meanwhile, capture occasions on which
jurisdictional overlap remains, but regulatory dependence is lacking.
Regulatory agencies enjoy the ability to proceed as they wish, without regard
to the will of regulatory entities beyond their jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, any interaction that occurs is purely voluntary, arising at the
discretion of the participating agencies. When interaction does occur, the
choices and approaches of an agency's regulatory counterpart are not
binding either as a formal or practical matter. Such interaction is pure
dialogue. Given as much, it is also likely to be of a relatively intermittent
character.
The decision to enter into foreign treaty relationships falls within this
category. The same can be said of the SEC's interactions with the general
membership of IOSCO, as opposed to members with significant securities
markets or foreign portfolio investment in the United States. 223  Nothing
compels SEC interaction with the Albanian Securities Commission or the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Zambia. Rather, to whatever
extent they occur, such interactions are a product of voluntary dialogue, to
be initiated and abandoned at will.
Putting together our axes capturing the degree of dependence and the
reciprocity/parity of any such dependence, we have the bounds of our
typology. On the horizontal axis are various more imbalanced or
hierarchical patterns of interaction among regulatory entities, including
federal-state relations under the Supremacy Clause and, slightly removed
from the present analysis, the supervisory relationship of central and
regional offices of a single administrative agency. On the vertical axis we
have voluntary dialogue among regulatory institutions, including treaty
relationships and SEC interaction with the mass of IOSCO membership.224
Within these bounds falls the universe of intersystemic regulation. Here,
to start with the baseline assumption of our schematic, the relevant
moreover, there are political limits as well, as evident in the unsuccessful efforts to preempt Eliot
Spitzer's enforcement activities. See Jones, supra note 28, at 115-16.
2 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000) (precluding states from imposing registration requirements on
securities offered to qualified purchasers by a company listed on a national exchange).
222 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(lH2) (2000) (preempting state law securities fraud class actions).
223 See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on Foreign Bank
Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 479 (1992) (noting that the SEC focuses most of its
international efforts on major industrialized nations).224 Such purely dialogic interactions might be alternatively characterized as grounded in a form of
"comity." See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991) (describing
the cacophony of definitions of comity).
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regulatory agencies exercise overlapping regulatory authority over the same
individuals, institutions, or issues. Further, given some dynamic of
reciprocity, or parity, in the dependence at work, any interaction is not of a
purely hierarchical nature. As the relevant regulatory entities are at least
somewhat dependent on one another, we also have something more than
dialogue. While conceptually less familiar than points falling on the axes of
our spectrum-unidirectional/hierarchical relations and pure dialogue-
such "intermediate" interactions represent an important (and growing) subset
of the universe of cross-jurisdictional interactions among regulatory
institutions.
(e.g, ft~aV' rdlate; SEC
with gelmrl IOsc0
(Iterdependence)
MIER&RCHICAI
Redprocity NO-,ECIPROCALPaidtyREIATIO1S
Parity (e4g, kLderal premipion;
kitma-agewy intractiow)
(Unidiectional
Dependence)
(Low) (High)
Depes of Dapenec
Figure 1.
The Bounds of Regulatory Dependence in Cross-Jurisdictional Regulatory Interaction
To further appreciate the realm of intersystemic regulatory interaction,
it is useful to divide it further. One might cite, to begin, various cases of
intersystemic regulation falling in the range immediately adjacent to the
x-axis and its one-sided interactions. Congressional reliance on the U.S.
Constitution's Spending Clause as a constraint on state law is one example.225
Given the Supreme Court's recognition of broad federal authority to
condition state access to federal funds on compliance with federal mandates,
Congress enjoys significant authority to impose its will on state
governments. For years, federal insistence on state imposition of a
225 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the ... general
Welfare of the United States..."). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power,
4 CHAP. L. REv. 89 (2001) (identifying the Spending Clause as an effective mechanism of
congressional regulation of state law).
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fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit as a condition to the receipt of certain
federal highway funds made that limit the common law of the land.226 Yet
federal-state interaction under the Spending Clause remains something less
than hierarchy, given states' ability to maintain their preferred policies, by
declining federal funds.227
Other examples can be found within the broad category of delegated
federal programs.228  In numerous areas of environmental law, for example,
federal mandates define certain minimum standards for environmental
protection. Implementation of these goals, however, is largely delegated to the
states, in the form of broad regulatory and enforcement authority coupled with
recurrent occasions for federal oversight.229 In many cases, such delegation
has allowed states to create a more balanced pattern of interdependence and a
consequently less hierarchical pattern of intersystemic regulation. 230  Even
where a degree of slippage occurs, however, relevant standards remain those
of the federal government. Federal permitting and auditing of state
implementation plans offers a further element of hierarchy or inequivalence.231
Transnational examples of regulatory interactions close to our x-axis
boundary of non-reciprocity/hierarchy are, unsurprisingly, harder to come
by. A potential example might be Security Council resolutions. While
compliance with the latter can-at some basic level-be resisted, the
availability of economic sanctions and even military intervention to
enforce resolutions limits the potential for such avoidance.232 Thus,
compliance with Security Council resolutions is likely to be the norm.
The SEC experiences relatively little such interaction transnationally.
But SEC pressure on regulators in smaller foreign markets to cooperate with
U.S. enforcement efforts and even to alter domestic legislation might be seen
as a relatively one-sided pattern of intersystemic regulation. Domestically,
actual threats of federal preemption-as in the proposed response to
226 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 446 & n.l (9th Cit. 1989) (summarizing the history of
federal regulation of speed limits).
227 Cf Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. ___ 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1306 (2006) (noting that universities that were opposed to visits by military recruiters could bar them
by simply refusing to accept federal funds).
228 See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 256-58 (2000).
229 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A
Comparative Overview, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503, 522 (1995).
230 In the administration of the Clean Water Act's total maximum daily load rules, for example,
the practical complexities of day-to-day implementation undermine the credibility of any federal threat
of takeover. See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION (2000).
231 See Murchison, supra note 229, at 540-41.
232 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, IM 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (imposing comprehensive
and mandatory sanctions on Iraq which prohibited the export of all commodities and products from Iraq,
and the sale and supply of all products and commodities to Iraq).
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Spitzer's interventions233 -might be said to give rise to some such dynamic.
The potential for SEC intervention in state litigation, causing removal to a
federal forum, 34 has a similar character.
In the foregoing interactions, each entity is dependent on the other-to
varying degrees-in the pursuit of its regulatory mission. Yet such
dependence is not evenly distributed. While the SEC is faced with some
dependence on regulators in small foreign markets, it is exceedingly limited in
degree. Its independent capacity to act remains quite great. Albanian
securities market regulators also enjoy some independence from the SEC. Yet
they are heavily dependent on access to global financial markets, which the
SEC can significantly influence. The cases of intersystemic regulation falling
closest to the x-axis of our typology thus exhibit a relatively unidirectional
dependence.
A degree of dependence is similarly present on the occasions for
intersystemic regulation falling alongside the y-axis and its characteristic
pattern of voluntary dialogue. Relevant transnational examples of
intersystemic regulation of this form might include a variety of interactions in
the category of foreign relations. In fact, foreign relations generally might be
said to fall in this range. 235 Additionally, one might think of the relatively
minimal obligations attendant to Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN) treaties, 236 as well as the relations established under military
cooperation agreements,237 as relatively dialogic patterns of intersystemic
regulation. In each of these cases, the level of obligation-and resulting
dependence-is low, yet produces something more than pure dialogue.
Turning to the domestic sphere, certain interactions among state regulators
are exemplary of relatively dialogic patterns of intersystemic regulation.
Cooperative economic development programs may be occasions for this
pattern of interaction; regulation of certain non-critical, overlapping resources
might also fall within this category.
The SEC's work with IOSCO on non-essential aspects of market
regulation fits within this subset of intersystemic regulation.238 Here, one
233 See Jones, supra note 28, at 115-16.
234 See 7 U.S.C. § 788bb(f)(2) (2000) (providing for removal of"any covered class action brought
in any State court involving a covered security ... to the Federal district court for the district in which
the action is pending").
235 See ROBERT J. LIEBER, No COMMON POWER: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
3-4 (2001) (describing the implications of the absence of central authority in an international system).
236 Under FCN treaties, states pledge to provide nationals of other signatories with limited rights
of entry and access and opportunities to engage in business inside state borders. See RUDOLF DOLZER
& MARGARETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 10 (1995).
237 See R.R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549,
550-51 (1980) (describing military cooperation agreements as "legally fragile").
238 The International Competition Network--"an international organization of government
regulators that sponsors conferences to promote harmonization"--is another example. See Stephan,
supra note 16, at 195.
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finds some element of dependence, in that global financial markets are
characterized by a degree of integration. As a consequence, even the
smallest markets can be expected to receive some heed from the SEC. Yet
such attention is not significant enough to distinguish the relevant
interactions sharply from a pattern of dialogue. The same can be said of
joint, or at least coordinated, litigation by the SEC and state regulators.239
Again, we have something more than dialogue; given the ability of each
entity to proceed on its own, however, it is not a great deal more.
Relatively dialogic patterns of intersystemic regulation, then, are
characterized by some degree of dependence alongside varying degrees of
reciprocity or bidirectionality in that dependence. At the margin, the SEC
cares about certain Albanian legal norms, and Mississippi cares about certain
policy choices of the state of Louisiana. Given their substantial
independence, however, the SEC's and Mississippi's dependence on their
counterparts is limited. Whatever interest the SEC might have in working
with Albanian market regulators, or in litigating jointly with state authorities,
it is not heavily dependent on either in pursuing its regulatory goals.
DIALOGIC
INTERSYSTEMIC REGULATION
(e.g, FNC treaties; Military cooperation
agreenents; Certainiatlerstate regulation; SEC
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Figure 2.
Relatively Hierarchical and Relatively Dialogic Patterns of Intersystemic Regulation
239 E.g., SEC Litig. Release No. 18115 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lrl8115.htm (acknowledging the assistance of NASD, the New York Stock Exchange, the New
York Attorney General, and other state regulators in the settlement of SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., Nos. 03 CV 2941 (WHP), 03 CV 2947 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.)). Another example might
be Eliot Spitzer's formation of a multi-state task force to target securities law violations at major Wall
Street firms. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, supra note 39.
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Given the relatively non-reciprocal, or hierarchical, patterns of
interaction closest to our x-axis and the relative independence that is
characteristic of interactions closest to the y-axis, it becomes clear that it is
the intersystemic regulatory interactions falling beyond these near bounds
that are most rife for "dialectical regulation"-for a pattern of regulatory
engagement that is "genuinely multilevel in nature." 240 Here, we surely
have something more than dialogue. The relevant interactions are far from
voluntary. Given real dependence, participants cannot ignore one other.
On the other hand, a strong dynamic of hierarchy, or other tendency toward
unidirectional dependence, is also lacking. There is little place for
coercion. What potentially emerges from this juxtaposition is a complex
interplay of regulatory conflict, cooperation, and coordination 241 especially
well-suited to offer the various benefits enumerated in Part III. As Scott
and Holder suggest:
Here, the multiplicity of sites and levels of. . .governance
emerge as opportunity not threat. The processes and
mechanisms for revision imply the construction of a
relationship between [regulatory institutions] which is
collaborative, not hierarchical, and which is premised on the
positive value of diversity, experimentation and learning.242
As evident in those occasions on which delegated federal programs in
the environmental arena produce a strong dynamic of federal-state
interdependence, cross-border environmental regulation may offer the best
examples of intersystemic regulation falling in the middle range of our
typology, both transnationally and domestically.243 As between the United
States and Canada, environmental harms committed in one jurisdiction will
often produce effects in the other. Thus, after negotiation of a reciprocal
agreement on acid rain, domestic legislation in both the United States and
240 de Bfirca, supra note 13, at 815-16 (suggesting open method of coordination "offers a
methodology which can neither be dismissed as 'primarily national' or 'primarily EU-level' but which
is genuinely multilevel in nature").
241 See Esty, supra note 6, at 1556-57 & n.214 (labeling such combinations "regulatory co-
opetition") (citing ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996)).
242 Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 42-43.
243 See, e.g., David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws
and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 42-47 (2001) (describing
federal-local collaboration in water policy reform); see also Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 214-15
(explaining the challenges of institutional coordination among state and local governments). The direct
coordination among Environmental Protection Agency and state officials regarding "new source
review" issues under the Clean Air Act is emblematic. In that case, the Director of the EPA's Air
Enforcement Division joined with enforcement officials in state attorneys general's offices, as well as
environmental protection groups, to coordinate litigation strategies. Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24,
at 123-24.
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Canada was amended to better protect non-nationals. 244  Analogous
interstate interactions, particularly between the states of New England and
its neighbors to the south and southwest, are to similar effect.245
Beyond environmental regulation, other examples might also be
offered. Transnationally, some of the clearest incidents of dialectical
regulation may come in the law enforcement context, including efforts to
curtail money laundering, the drug trade, and even terrorism.
246
Domestically, a great deal of commercial regulation has some such quality.
Regional markets cutting across state lines are likely to drive dialectical
patterns of engagement among state authorities. Cross-border resources
subject to commercial exploitation, including natural gas, also demand
such active and engaged interaction.247
In the experience of the SEC, of course, examples abound.
Transnational cases include the SEC's active engagement with national
market regulators and IOSCO in its enforcement efforts. Its interactions in
pursuit of harmonization, with the IASB, and with the Canadian Securities
Administrators Association, and particularly the Ontario Securities
Commission, regarding the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System,248 are to
similar effect. Domestically, the SEC's engagement with Eliot Spitzer in
the regulation of the New York-based financial markets is emblematic of
the strong-form engagement of dialectical regulation.249
In this category of regulatory interactions, dependence is at its peak
and is strongly bilateral. The core regulatory pursuits of relevant
participants depend on the cooperation of their counterparts. Absent
24 See Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
345, 354 (2000).
245 Cf Daniel B. Trinkle, Comment, Cars, Congress, and Clean Air for the Northeast: A
Separation of Powers Analysis of the Ozone Transport Commission, 23 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 169
(1995) (discussing the creation of a multi-state consortium authorized to propose ozone standards for
the northeast region).
246 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 139 n.612 (2005)
(discussing transnational coordination to prevent terrorist attacks); Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel
Approaches to Combating the Financing of Crime: A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REv.
509 (2005) (discussing transnational efforts to combat organized crime).
247 Cf Patrick Daniel, President & Chief Executive Officer, Enbridge Inc., Opening Remarks at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center Energy Forum: Cross-Border Issues Facing the Canadian and U.S.
Energy Industries (Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://www.enbridge.com/about/pdf/pat-040927.pdf
(underscoring the critical nature of the supply of natural gas in North America as well as the need for
collaboration in this area); Welcoming Remarks by Lee Hamilton, President of the Woodrow Wilson
Center, at the Webcast by the Canada Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(Mar. 21 2005), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfin?fuseaction=topics.eventsummary&
event id= 113225 (discussing the benefit of increased cross-border dialogue in meeting the global demand
for natural gas).
24 See supra text accompanying notes 72-79. As the examples discussed above make clear,
while the SEC is surely first among equals when it comes to its foreign counterparts, its powers remain
limited in important respects. The realities of national sovereignty and the limitations on
extraterritoriality make even the SEC dependent on others when it goes abroad.
249 See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
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recurrent and substantive coordination with foreign market regulators and
Eliot Spitzer, the SEC's effective pursuit of its regulatory mission will be
undermined. Independence, of course, remains; each regulatory institution
has the capacity to act on its own. Yet such independence is overshadowed
by the cross-jurisdictional dependence that is also present. °
Collectively, then, we might construct the following picture:
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Figure 3.
Dialectical Regulation
25 1
With this typology of cross-jurisdictional regulatory interactions
arising from jurisdictional overlap in mind, we can next explore the
characteristics of a given regulatory relationship that might encourage one
or another pattern of engagement-whether dialogue or hierarchy,
intersystemic regulation of a relatively more dialogic or hierarchical
character, or strong-form dialectical regulation. Depending on such
variables as the centrality of information, individual rights issues, the range
250 See, e.g., Klaus W. Grewlich, Telecommuncations and 'Cyberspace': Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation and the Constitutionalization of International Law, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION, supra note 3, at 273, 297-99 (discussing cross-border interdependence in the context of
regulating global telecommunications).
25 1 At the intersection of our axes is a null set of sorts. Strong unidirectionality or hierarchy, thus,
cannot be reconciled with a low degree of dependence.
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of perspectives in play, and the continuity of the relationship, particular
patterns of engagement may be more desirable, whether for reasons of
legitimacy, efficiency, or upside-potential. To analogous effect, when a
particular pattern of engagement is sought after, incorporation of certain
institutional characteristics-mechanisms of continuity are an obvious
example-may serve to move a regulatory relationship in that direction.
Before turning to such variables for the balance of the present analysis, it
is useful to briefly highlight the ways in which the distinct patterns of
engagement captured within our typology of interactions might impact the
management of regulatory challenges. A recent decision of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency to preclude the enforcement of state anti-
discrimination laws against federally chartered banks offers a useful foil.
252
Notwithstanding its prior willingness to share the regulation of federally
chartered banks with state regulators, in 2004, the Comptroller issued new
guidelines barring state enforcement actions against the banks.253
In doing so, the Comptroller of the Currency might be seen as moving
the relevant relationship from dialectical regulation of a sort to a far more
hierarchical dynamic falling at or near the x-axis of our typology. With
this, of course, the potential benefits of intersystemic regulation, and
dialectical regulation particularly, in overcoming inertia, encouraging
innovation, and the like were necessarily sacrificed. 4 In some cases, one
might find reason to surrender such benefits, given attendant costs,
including the potential for state regulation of a given subject to
significantly undermine effective federal regulation. In the enforcement of
state anti-discrimination laws, however, it is not easy to identify such costs.
As such, the weakening of intersystemic regulation in the above case sits
uneasily with the present account.
One might even go a step further, to favor the initial federal-state
dynamic in bank regulation over more dialogic patterns of engagement
falling at or alongside the y-axis of our typology. In the latter case, perhaps
more familiar in state-state relations, federal and state regulators would
enjoy wide discretion to regulate at will. Given as much, however, their
engagement of one another would likely exhibit a lesser intensity, with
attendant implications for the payoffs in innovation, integration, and the like.
A final point on the normativity of dependence, as used herein, also
deserves emphasis. In the interest of offering some preliminary synthesis
of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence in the interaction of
regulatory entities across jurisdictional lines, the present analysis skirts the
252 Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
253 Id. at 385. Notably, the Comptroller did not dispute the applicability of state anti-discrimination
laws to the relevant banks, but challenged only the enforcement of those rules by state authorities. Id.
254 See supra Part III.
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line of normative and descriptive analysis. This is most evident in its
treatment of dependence. For the most part, I aspire merely to offer a
positive account of the ways in which a degree of dependence of
independently constituted regulatory agencies may drive particular patterns
of engagement. In positing the utility of such engagement in
acknowledging identity, overcoming inertia, encouraging innovation, and
facilitating integration, however, I also hope to suggest some normative
benefit of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence.
This, in turn, points to a mixed positive-and-normative claim about the
types of problems well suited to intersystemic regulation, and dialectical
regulation particularly. When identity is ambiguous, inertia is present,
innovation is lacking, or integration is needed, jurisdictional overlap and,
even more importantly, some meaningful degree of regulatory dependence,
may be of value. Such overlap and dependence may be a way to secure the
benefits of acknowledging identity, overcoming inertia, encouraging
innovation, and facilitating integration. Conversely, intersystemic
regulation and dialectical regulation, can be understood as a way to manage
a degree of overlap and dependence.
B. The Variables of Intersystemic Regulatory Design
As the very articulation of a typology of cross-jurisdictional regulatory
interactions helps to suggest, there is nothing inherently superior to
intersystemic regulation over either the non-reciprocity/hierarchy or the
pure dialogue that constitute its bounds. Nor is dialectical regulation
categorically preferable to the relatively more non-reciprocal or more
dialogic forms of intersystemic regulation. Rather, selected indicia may
variously favor pure hierarchy or pure dialogue, more hierarchical or more
dialogic patterns of intersystemic regulation, or dialectical regulation, in
any given case.
255
What features of institutional design or extrinsic circumstance might
motivate, facilitate, or normatively favor a particular choice of where
within our typology of cross-jurisdictional engagement a particular incident
of regulatory interaction falls? What variables might encourage domestic
or transnational regulators to pursue one or another pattern of interaction?
What factors are likely to render a particular pattern effective in securing
the benefits of intersystemic regulation in any given case? Finally, what
factors might counsel our design of regulatory regimes to favor particular
patterns of engagement? Here, I note some of the features that might
encourage patterns of interaction at or alongside the bounds of our
typology, leaving for Part V a more detailed treatment of the essential
255 Cf Esty, supra note 12, at 574.
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prerequisites and predictors of the pattern of dialectical regulation standing
at the heart of our spectrum.
A comprehensive theory of the broad universe of cross-jurisdictional
interactions and the variables suited to their emergence is beyond the scope
of the present, necessarily preliminary analysis. Furthermore, context is
highly relevant to how cross-jurisdictional regulatory interaction will play
out in any given case.256 Hence the need for the microanalysis of
institutions suggested at the outset.257 Building on our proposed typology
of interactions, however, we can begin to identify potentially salient factors
in the emergence of one or another pattern of interaction. These are
offered without claim of exclusivity or ranking. They merely represent
some of the factors that might be weighed in determining the optimal
institutional design for regulatory engagement in any given case.
Several factors can be seen as favoring non-reciprocity or hierarchy, or
at least intersystemic interactions of a more non-reciprocal nature.
A heightened need for particularized expertise in the regulation of a given
subject, to begin, might favor such unidirectional patterns of interaction.
Where expertise is essential, one might imagine a related perception,
however inaccurate, that the underlying knowledge behind such expertise
is itself of some singular nature. If this is so, one regulatory institution
might logically be seen as best suited to design appropriate regulation.
Both entities, in this view, could not be equally "expert."
A strong interest to ensure accountability, finality, and uniformity,
might also favor some degree of hierarchy. Hierarchy may help to minimize
ambiguity in the lines of authority,259 and hence evasions of responsibility.
Everyone knows where "the buck stops." By contrast, more dialogic
patterns of engagement, let alone the pluralistic regulatory dynamic of
dialectical regulation, are likely to leave greater room for potential
shirking.26°
Finally, a desire to protect specific and discrete individual rights may-
at least in some circumstances-also favor more hierarchical modes of
interaction. While such hierarchy may threaten individual rights in some
ways,26' the more formalized regimes falling closer to the x-axis may better
256 See generally Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24 (arguing that context is critical in analyzing
the background and circumstances of regulatory responses).
257 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
258 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 290-92.
259 See, e.g., Mehmet Bac, The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
101, 104-06 (1998) (illustrating through game theory that a clear hierarchical structure that rewards
supervision by authorities may curb corruption levels within an organization); see also Schapiro, supra
note 6, at 291 (stressing that ambiguity and a lack of clear, demonstrative control by a designated wing
of the government can lead to confusion among citizens).260 See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 225; Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 5 1-52.
261 Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ensure attention to, and protection of, certain rights. At a minimum, a focus
on individual rights might at least raise concerns about looser dialogic
patterns of interaction, and dialectical regulation even more so, given their
potential to impact rights in significant ways, yet offer limited mechanisms
of formal recourse to victims. Notably, this has been among the most
significant concerns with the rise of non-traditional patterns of regulation in
the European Union, under the open method of coordination.262
An initial factor favoring more dialogic patterns of engagement,
whether pure dialogue or intersystemic regulation of a dialogic character,
might equally be understood as a factor weighing against reliance on more
unidirectional patterns of interaction. The more information-intensive a
given subject of regulation, the greater the attraction of a more open system
of engagement. Dialogic patterns of interaction thus create ready
opportunities for information enhancement. The same is true of dialectical
regulatory regimes, as suggested by the important place of jurisdictional
overlap, regulatory dependence, and active engagement in the information-
intensive universe of environmental regulation.263
Other factors favoring dialogic forms of interaction can also be
identified. The more limited the general alignment of policy preferences
across relevant jurisdictional lines, the more attractive will be purely
dialogic interactions and intersystemic regulatory relationships
characterized by more limited dependence. Generally speaking, such
alignment may be substantially less across national boundaries than
domestic ones. Whatever their origins, however, divergent preferences are
likely to make unidirectional dependence, and even dialectical regulation,
less viable. Where policy goals are characterized by some general
alignment, the relatively invasive patterns of interaction along our x-axis-
and surely patterns of dialectical regulation-may be more acceptable.
Where preference alignment is limited, however, dialogue may be
embraced as a low impact means to facilitate learning among independent
262 See Grainne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott, New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, at
833-34 (Chapter draft, forthcoming). Enshrined in the European Union's employment policy, the
"open method of coordination" (OMC) was first introduced at the Lisbon European Council Summit.
de Birca, supra note 13, at 825. In its purest form, the OMC prescribes four elements:
The first is the setting of EU level guidelines for achieving certain goals/objectives,
the second the establishment of benchmarks and specific indicators as a way of
comparing best practices, the third the translation of the European guidelines into
national (and regional) policies suited to the needs of different States and regions
and the fourth entails monitoring, evaluation and peer review on a periodic basis.
Id. Besides the OMC, other collaborative governance schemes have also been utilized in Europe,
including the use of broad committee structures in the implementation of European-wide structural
funding initiatives. See Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 4 (2002).
263 See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 219-20 (describing how overlapping federal, state and local
institutions results in an increase in the amount and availability of information in environmental
management).
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regulatory institutions.
A greater degree of uncertainty in a given area of regulation may also
26favor more dialogic interactions.   Stating it slightly differently, if a given
regulatory field is in the midst of or susceptible to rapid change, it may be
more or less amenable to particular patterns of regulatory interaction.2 65
While other conclusions might be asserted, at least some argument might
be made that uncertainty will ordinarily favor pure dialogue or
intersystemic regulation of a dialogic nature. In essence, the willingness to
accept greater degrees of dependence may be limited amidst transition.266
A relatively less dense universe of ties across the relevant jurisdictional
lines, beyond the particular regulatory questions at stake, may also favor
more dialogic patterns of interaction. In fairly spare relationships, little more
than dialogue may be realistic. As I will describe more fully below,
however, greater density of relationships may facilitate the emergence of
closer and more active patterns of interaction.267
Lesser capacity for the institutionalization of cross-jurisdictional
interactions may also favor more dialogic engagements. As we move from
pure non-reciprocity or hierarchy to relatively hierarchical patterns of
intersystemic regulation, through the active and recurrent interactions of
dialectical regulation, and reach the range of dialogic patterns of interaction,
there is likely to be increasingly less demand for institutional continuity and
stability. Dialogue requires far less of an institutional framework than
hierarchy, or even dialectical regulation. Given as much, where such
frameworks are likely to be excessively costly or otherwise difficult to
establish, more dialogic patterns of interaction might be favored.268
Finally, a potentially mixed factor might be the socio-political dynamic
within which the relevant regulatory interaction takes place. One might
imagine, for example, a context of special sensitivity to the protection and
preservation of national autonomy.26 9 In such circumstances, pure dialogue
264 Relatively greater complexity in a given area of law may be to similar effect. Cf Stephan,
supra note 16, at 199 (noting that a lack of understanding of competition policy makes vesting
regulatory power in an international agency especially disadvantageous).
265 See Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 51-52 (discussing the difficulties of different models in
the complex and rapidly changing area of European Union environmental law).
266 One could also argue that uncertainty and change open the door to dialectical regulation.
Minimally, stakeholder resistance to more active engagement may potentially be diminished.267 See infra Part V.D.
268 It is notable, thus, that even more intermediate patterns of regulatory interaction-though often
conceived as alternatives to formalized patterns of regulatory engagement-are increasingly characterized
by a certain degree of institutionalization. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 217-18 (discussing the
creation of a Chesapeake Bay Commission and Chesapeake Executive Council as examples of regional
coordinating mechanisms); Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 28-29.
269 For example, elements of dialectical review in European courts developed only incrementally,
as tempered by national sentiment. See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2145. States may reject outright a
system of interaction that too heavily constrains sovereignty. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Heifer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean
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or dialogic patterns of intersystemic regulation may be favored. Such
interactions may help to advance certain of the enumerated benefits of
intersystemic regulation, yet minimize the risk of political backlash.27° On
the other hand, one might also imagine a political dynamic favoring more
robust patterns of dialectical regulation. Active regulatory competition
within a given system, for example, might encourage an agency to look
outside its jurisdiction for sources of greater regulatory efficacy, legitimacy,
and authority.271 Even absent regulatory competition, a weak regulatory
agency might secure some advantage from an active pattern of engagement
with regulatory institutions beyond its jurisdiction: It might acquire both
legitimacy and even affirmative power from a dialectical partner.272
Again, it bears emphasizing that this enumeration is far from exclusive.
Further, its operationalization necessitates some multivariate analysis. Even
as it stands, however, the above factors may hint at a systemic treatment of
growing patterns of regulatory interaction across jurisdictional lines. As
such interactions move from spontaneous incidents to purposeful elements in
the institutional design of particular regulatory schemes, it is essential to
think carefully about the appropriate pattern of regulatory interaction in any
given situation. In this way, the prospect of approaching optimal patterns of
regulatory engagement is likely to grow, and the promised benefits of
enhanced regulatory design are more likely to be achieved.
V. TOWARD A MODEL OF DIALECTICAL REGULATION
As suggested above, the benefits of intersystemic regulation
enumerated in Part Ill-acknowledging identity, overcoming inertia,
encouraging innovation, and facilitating integration-are likely to be
greatest where we find the relatively strong form of intersystemic
regulatory interaction I have termed dialectical regulation. In this pattern
of interaction, regulatory entities situated across jurisdictional lines, driven
by jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence upon one another,
engage in an active pattern of recurrent interaction, experimentation,
learning, and growth. Collectively, these features encourage some degree
of integration in the collective regulatory regime-a co-regulation of
sorts.
2 73
Several factors-some inherent to institutional context, but others
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832, 1891-92 (2002) (examining
Caribbean backlash against limits on sovereignty).
270 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2143-47.
271 See generally Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure In Futures Markets: Jurisdictional
Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 367, 383-84
(1984) (discussing the efficiency advantages of regulatory competition among agencies).
272 See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition,
52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1372-74 (2003).
2173 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 10.
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susceptible to regulatory design-might be seen to motivate and facilitate a
dialectical pattern of regulatory engagement. I begin with a handful of
precursor elements. Beyond these, I identify three core features that are
likely to be needed, if general patterns of intersystemic regulation are to
rise to the level of strong-form dialectical regulation: a measure of both
dependence and independence, the simultaneous presence of some
alignment and some divergence in perspectives, and a certain density of
regulatory interaction. Finally, the prospects for dialectical regulation may
be somewhat enhanced by some capacity for exit.
Two points bear highlighting. First, while I draw on the experience of
the SEC to add greater clarity to each of the factors below, I do not claim
to derive the latter from that experience. Rather, the enumerated factors
represent hypotheses about what elements might produce stronger patterns
of regulatory engagement across jurisdictional lines. This highlights a
second point, that the ensuing enumeration is not intended to capture
sufficient elements to produce dialectical regulation, or even necessary
elements, for that matter. Rather, dialectical regulation might not emerge,
even with each of the factors below in place. Likewise, it might emerge,
with one or more of the elements missing. As each factor is in greater
evidence, however, the relative likelihood that patterns of dialectical
regulation will emerge increases.
A. Precursors to a Regulatory Dialectic
As a baseline premise of the analysis offered herein, the most obvious
predicate to the dialectical engagement of regulators across jurisdictional
lines is the reality of some overlap in authority. Dialectical regulation can
only arise in those circumstances in which the relevant subject of
regulation-whether individual, institutional, or subject-matter-itself
manifests an intersystemic character. In the case of the SEC, by way of
example, this is evident in the nature of cross-listed corporations, in
overseas securities trading, and in the operation of mutual fund managers
and investment advisors within the overlapping jurisdiction of both federal
and state authorities.274
Similarly elemental in the emergence of any pattern of intersystemic
regulation, and hence of dialectical regulation particularly, are the distinct
origins of the overlapping regulatory regimes. While some pattern of
interactive regulation may operate within a single system-the early
interactions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice are one example 275-this pattern exhibits
274 See supra Part 11.
275 See Frank Partnoy, Multinational Regulatory Competition and Single-Stock Futures, 21 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 641,644 n.7 (2001).
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different characteristics than the pattern explored herein, and is unlikely to
lead to similar ends. The grounding of relevant regulatory entities in
distinct sources of power is thus an important precursor to any dialectical
regulatory regime.
As suggested by the very nature of the present analysis, however,
overlapping jurisdiction of independently constituted regulatory entities
need not produce a dynamic of intersystemic regulatory engagement, let
alone the active engagement of dialectical regulation. Rather, these
predicate features have more often triggered one of two alternative
responses. First, the presence of overlap is often denied,276 whether by
denying that the competing regulatory entity has the power to exercise
meaningful influence, asserting clear lines separating the relevant entities'
jurisdiction, or blatantly disregarding the other body.277 Alternatively, a
second response is to acknowledge overlap, but press for the drawing of
jurisdictional lines in such a fashion as to eliminate it.278 Given these
conventional responses to cross-jurisdictional regulatory overlap, more is
needed to lay the groundwork for dialectical regulation.
To begin with, the interaction of regulatory institutions across
jurisdictional lines may be most likely to produce intersystemic regulation,
and particularly an iterative dialectical engagement, where such interaction
is voluntary, yet somewhat unavoidable. In substantial part, the dialectical
engagement of regulatory entities arises where the continued efficacy of
each is dependent on such engagement. In the SEC context, one might
recall the transnational interactions arising from the SEC's insider trading
enforcement efforts, and its need to engage Eliot Spitzer on mutual fund
regulation when he appeared ready to go it alone. In each case, the SEC
was constrained in how it might proceed.279
Yet in each case, one also finds some dimension of choice and
discretion. This is particularly clear in the SEC's enforcement of insider
trading rules. It was the SEC's own decision to pursue aggressive
enforcement of insider trading rules overseas, that created its dependence
on European regulators. 280 As to its interaction with Spitzer, to similar
effect, the SEC was not previously interested in regulating the entities
Spitzer brought within his sights, and might have left any such regulation
to Spitzer alone to pursue. The dynamic of interaction thus arose from the
SEC's pursuit of its own goals and, perhaps more significantly, from its
276 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 264 (criticizing the Supreme Court's continued insistence on
jurisdictional divisions).
277 See, e.g., id. at 262--64 (discussing the Supreme Court's reasons for continuing to follow a
dualist approach in cases involving federal and state overlap).
278 See Stephan, supra note 16, at 203-05 (noting various efforts to delineate clear lines of
jurisdictional authority in transnational antitrust enforcement).
279 See supra Part II.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
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desire to expand its goals and arguably its jurisdictional reach.
Purely voluntary interactions among regulatory entities across
jurisdictional lines might therefore be seen as insufficiently forceful to
produce a dialectical pattern of engagement. At a minimum, such
engagement may be selective, such that sensitive cases and issues are
avoided. Yet these may well be the cases in which dialectical regulation
has its greatest capacity to drive innovation and integration, among other
ends. On the other hand, a degree of choice may also help to encourage a
dynamic pattern of regulatory engagement. Such choice may produce a
greater willingness to engage in interaction instead of denying the presence
of overlap or competing regulatory power, or seeking to define clear and
exclusive lines of jurisdictional authority.28' An overlapping jurisdictional
pattern deriving from the discretionary efforts of independent regulatory
agencies to advance their respective mandates may therefore offer the best
soil for the growth of dialectical engagement. At a minimum, a degree of
voluntariness may help to obviate political resistance to regulatory
dependence across jurisdictional lines.
A final precursor to a strong pattern of engagement across
jurisdictional lines is a degree of functional thinking regarding the
regulatory obligations of each institution. Each entity must avoid overly
formalistic conceptions of the ends being pursued. In comparative law,
functionalism encourages attention to respective nations' relevant legal
ends, rather than their characterizations of particular rules of law.282 The
question is not whether a country has a consideration doctrine, but how it
determines which private promises it will enforce through state-sponsored
283adjudication. Some similar mindset is necessary for the emergence of a
regime of dialectical regulation. The extent of jurisdictional overlap is
likely to be paltry given an overly formalist assessment of the relevant
subject of regulation. To be more precise, the extent of overlap may not be
that different. The extent to which such overlap is acknowledged and
appreciated, however, will vary. With the broader potential scope of
overlap arising from a functional analysis, opportunities for engagement
will necessarily increase as well.
281 Cf de Btirca, supra note 13, at 827-28 (explaining that the open method of coordination model
allowed member states operational discretion).
282 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (Tony Weir
trans., 3d ed. 1998); John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 621-22
(1998).
283 See Reitz, supra note 282, at 621; see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to
Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1009 (1959) (comparing
French and German consideration doctrines through the type of problems the doctrine addresses and
resolves).
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B. Dependence and Independence in a Regulatory Dialectic
With the precursors to a dialectical pattern of engagement in mind, we
can turn to the first of three substantive characteristics of such engagement,
and hence correlates of its potential emergence. The most essential feature
of a regulatory dialectic is the presence of a degree of both dependence and
independence in the relevant relationship.28 4 We can begin with the
element of dependence, arguably the most determinative feature in a
pattern of dialectical regulation.
Dialectical regulation arises from the focused engagement of
regulatory entities with one another. Yet engagement across jurisdictional
lines-and even within a given system-is not the norm. Conventional
accounts emphasize regulatory institutions' focus on their own interests,
interest groups, and agendas. 28 5 Whether one sees regulatory entities as
responsive to public welfare or private interests, their focus is not
ordinarily seen to be other regulatory institutions. Where it is, it is more
likely to be seen as motivated by regulatory competition, than by a
dynamic of engagement and interaction. Patterns of regulatory
balkanization are the norm-in perception, and at least to some extent even
in practice-rather than the exception.
For active and significant engagement to arise, some effective demand
must be placed on participating regulatory institutions to pursue it. Such
demand arises naturally where each relevant entity needs the other to achieve
some part of what it must, or what it hopes to, accomplish. In the interaction
of courts, I have pointed to the indirect pressures that international tribunals
might place on domestic courts, through judgments imposed on their
coordinate executive and legislative branches. 286 Further, such tribunals may
sometimes undermine the effect-even if not the formal decree-of
domestic courts. A domestic judgment granting punitive damages, for
example, or the rejection of liability of a governmental entity, would
essentially be undone by even a collateral international award respectively
denying or granting relief.287 In various ways, then, international tribunals
may elicit the attention and engagement of domestic courts.
Analogous patterns of dependence exist in other circumstances of
regulatory interaction as well. Financial market regulation is no exception.
The SEC's desire to effectively regulate insider trading, even where
practiced overseas, makes the SEC dependent on the cooperation of foreign
284 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2089-91, 2094-95; see also Karkkainen, supra note 12, at
217-18.
285 See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLLM. L. REV.
2217, 2261-62 (2005).
286 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2102.
217 Id. at 2102-03.
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regulators.288 Similarly, the SEC's preservation of its mandate and its
preeminent role in the New York financial markets, require it to
acknowledge and coordinate effectively with Eliot Spitzer.289 The SEC's
pursuit of its goals, in essence, depends on Spitzer's cooperation.
While the latter examples invoke the vantage of the entity engaged in
affirmative regulation, one can also understand patterns of regulatory
dependence from the perspective of the non-regulating entity. In the
presence of meaningful dependence, the 'non-moving party' of sorts can
interfere with the ability of its regulatory counterpart to regulate
effectively. In this view, dialectical regulation might be seen to arise from
some capacity for "hold-up. 290  In such circumstances, one regulatory
institution enjoys the capacity to stymie the other's regulatory efforts.
However characterized, such dependence constitutes the most critical
determinant of a dialectical regulatory regime. As a dynamic matter,
regulatory interdependence is the essential driving force behind the active
interaction of regulatory entities across jurisdictional lines. Given the
aforementioned demands on agency action, a status quo of non-interaction
is likely to persist absent some dependence. Dependence is also critical to
an understanding of dialectical regulation as the most significant indicator
of those circumstances in which it may arise. Dependence is the
phenomenon conventionally lacking across jurisdictional lines. With its
introduction, the potential for intersystemic regulation emerges; with its
growing magnitude, we have the prospect of dialectical regulation.
As a corollary to the foregoing, independence may have its own,
distinct role in the emergence of dialectical regulation. Absent some
ability to act autonomously, a participating regulatory entity may simply be
too weak to assert itself in any potential interaction.29' Yet such assertion
goes to the heart of dialectical regulation and its beneficial results,
including the potential for desirable innovation. The dialogue at the center
of such interaction might be expected to descend to monologue, without
some degree of autonomy or independence.
Minimally, such independence might mean that neither regulatory
entity can silence the other, even where it can obviate the effect of its
actions.292 In the strong case of dialectical regulation, however, regulatory
288 See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
289 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. As noted above, the federal power of
preemption is not-in and of itself-sufficient to undermine such dependence. As evident in the failed
efforts to preempt Spitzer's enforcement efforts, even preemption has its limits. See Jones, supra
note 28, at 115-16.
290 See generally Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
291 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2089-90 (emphasizing the importance of autonomy).
Conversely, of course, too much independence undermines the pattern of interaction as well.
See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 216.
292 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 289 (emphasizing the symbolic importance of state enactments
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independence ought to mean more. Each entity must enjoy some range of
motion within its own domain. In the case of the SEC and Eliot Spitzer,
beyond the ability of each to undermine the other, each also has the
capacity to pursue its own goals independently.
Two additional points regarding dependence and independence deserve
note. It is important, to begin, that the relevant power of each entity not be
overly indirect or diffuse in nature. While social sanction may be an
effective regulatory tool,293 the threat of vague and broad reputational harm
may not suffice to produce an active pattern of dialectical engagement.
Rather, more focused or targeted social impacts, if not more direct
influences, are preferable. In the case of the SEC and Spitzer, the threat was
not of some generalized harm to the SEC's regulatory reputation, but of
direct interference with its mission.
Additionally, it is important to highlight that relevant regulatory power
need not be shared equally. It is unnecessary for dialectical regulation that
the relationship across regulatory systems be characterized by complete
parity. While the latter might make for a particularly strong and fruitful
dialectic, as suggested by our typology of cross-jurisdictional interactions, it
is likely to be quite rare, and is not essential to the emergence or success of
such a pattern. Rather, a dialectical pattern of engagement can arise out of
imperfectly balanced dependence and independence, so long as there is some
proportion of each.
C. Perspective and Dialectics
For dialectical regulation to contribute along the lines suggested in
Part III, a degree of both alignment and divergence in the relevant entities'
perspectives is also needed.294  To begin with, some alignment of
perspectives is essential.295  Participating regulatory institutions must
minimally share some commonality in their goals. A common commitment
to the effective regulation of market fraud and the achievement of "efficient"
financial markets, for example, is likely a prerequisite to dialectical
regulation in the securities markets. Absent such shared goals, it is unclear
what distinct market regulators would even have to talk about.
Beyond goals, some alignment in values may also be necessary.
Absent shared values, political barriers to engagement may be difficult to
overcome. Such alignment in values does not require interacting regulators
to be culturally similar. In that case, dialectical regulation would be an
in the face of superseding federal law).293 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 207-09 (2000).
294 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2095-96; Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 223.
295 Cf ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 5 (2d ed.
1993) (acknowledging that differences in legal values can be so extreme as to obviate the comparison
of legal rules).
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exceedingly rare phenomenon. Rather, there is need for some
commonality in foundational principles. A shared sense of the social
utility of efficiency, or perhaps a normative condemnation of fraud and
misrepresentation, would be examples in financial market regulation.
However general in nature, such shared values may serve to obviate
potential resistance to active regulatory engagement and coordination.
With reference to the benefits of dialectical regulation enumerated
above, the importance of some alignment in perspectives is readily
apparent. Minimally, any prospect of integration must depend on aligned
goals and values. It is unclear what integration would mean, absent at least
some correlation of goals. Even shared values may be important, however,
given the likely resistance to integration absent some common framework
of values. Practically speaking, the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System
might be feasible between the United States and Canada, but perhaps not
more universally. A degree of alignment in perspective may be similarly
important in dialectical regulation's reduction of regulatory inertia. The
latter function presumes, in some sense, pursuit of a common goal. Thus,
were a particular state attorney general in pursuit of dramatically different
ends than the SEC, her interventions would not likely trigger engagement
with the SEC.
Nevertheless, much of the utility of dialectical regulation is also lost
296
absent a countervailing divergence in perspective. This is most apparent
with reference to the potential for innovation. If perspectives are too
closely aligned, the capacity of dialectical regulation to induce innovation
is necessarily limited. Innovation depends on distinctly situated regulators
offering their distinct contributions in the collective development of
regulatory regimes. The source of Eliot Spitzer's impact is his distinct
vantage. Some part of the acknowledgement of identity may also be tied to
a divergence in perspective, given that the latter may explain the divergent
components of identity.297
Divergent regulatory perspectives may arise from any number of
sources. Most generally, they derive from the distinct sources of power out
of which relevant regulatory entities emerge.298 Given their differential
origins, some distinct set of goals and values is likely to be embraced by
each entity, which in turn shapes their perspectives. Aspects of institutional
design may also contribute to diversity in perspective.299 In the judicial
context, I have identified distinct mechanisms of appointment and rules of
296 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2095-97; see also Esty, supra note 6, at 1558 ("Policies
constructed on the basis of multiple perspectives permit decisionmakers to triangulate on the 'truth."').
297 On the other hand, the fail-safe functions of dialectical regulation (and hence the capacity to
overcome inertia), as well as the pursuit of integration, may be better served by minimal divergence.
298 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
2" See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 218.
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tenure, varied compositions of the bench, and divergent standards of review
as potential sources of diverse institutional perspectives.3° In the financial
markets, Eliot Spitzer's elected position necessarily offers him a distinct
view, favoring different approaches than the SEC.30 1 European Union
regulators may similarly enjoy distinct perspectives, arising from their
distinct vantage point; even the geographic reach of an agency may thus play
a role in shaping its perspective and approach.30 2
D. The Density of Dialectical Regulation
Beyond a mix of dependence and independence, and of aligned and
divergent perspectives, the third critical characteristic and predicate of a
dialectical pattern of intersystemic regulatory engagement is some context
of repeat interaction.30 3 Dialectical regulation thus requires a pattern of
interaction, rather than episodic incidents of regulatory overlap,
dependence, and engagement. While random and intermittent regulatory
interactions across jurisdictional lines are likely quite common, such
sporadic interactions are unlikely to produce truly dialectical regulation.3°
Whatever utility it may have, such intermittent engagement is unlikely to
advance the ends outlined above.30 5 Rather, those goals require a certain
density of interaction. This is most apparent in the pursuit of innovation
and integration.
Starting with the former, it is largely the need to interact recurrently
with one's regulatory counterpart that demands creative thinking and
resulting innovation. In essence, where one regulatory body knows that
some aspect of its efforts will consistently be tested for conformance with
the perspective of a counterpart, efforts to accommodate the latter are more
likely.30 6 While sporadic interactions might potentially produce the same
result, one would expect the occasional need for accommodation to be less
likely to prompt adjustments in prevailing norms. If I am more likely to
pay heed to an entity with which I will recurrently engage, I may also be
more likely to actually learn from it.30 7 Resulting innovations may also, as
a result, be more than skin-deep.
A context of recurrent interaction may be similarly essential to the goal
of integration. The latter is likely to depend on some context of familiarity
300 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2109-10.
30' Relative proximity to one interest group versus another may also impact an agency's
perspective. See Jones, supra note 20, at 636-37.
302 See Schapiro, supra note 6, at 252, 288. But see Buzbee, Contextual, supra note 24, at 110-11
(suggesting limits of geography).
303 See generally Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2097-101.
304 See id. at 2098.
301 See id. at 2100 (discussing the benefit of precedent arising from repeat plays).306 See id. at 2097-101.307 See id. at 2098-99.
[Vol. 38:863
DIALECTICAL REGULATION
and trust. The integration of the MJDS might be seen to derive from a
history of interaction among United States and Canadian securities market
regulators. 30 8 Further, since integration-at least of the variety I intend-is
incremental rather than wholesale in nature, repeat interactions are its
essential medium.
Two aspects of "density" suggest themselves. Most obviously, it
bespeaks a recurrence or continuity of engagement.3 °9 In essence, a given
issue needs to arise with some regularity. It is the SEC's recurrent need to
seek discovery and take other steps to enforce United States insider trading
rules abroad that motivates its active engagement with foreign regulators.
Any single case might be abandoned or handled with more onerous
procedures, but a succession of cases necessitates greater cooperation and
systematic interaction. 310  Where a particular issue is likely to be a
recurrent concern, then, the potential for dialectical regulation is greater.31
A further dimension of the relevant density of interaction might be
seen in the SEC's engagement with Eliot Spitzer. While recurrent
presentation of the same issue can be important, a certain multiplicity of
distinct and independent ties may also be significant. In essence, multiple
nodes of interaction between the relevant regulators-and resulting means
of influence between them-may further advance a pattern of dialectical
regulation. In the case of Spitzer, the SEC's incentives to engage actively
may not have been primarily about the potential recurrence of his claims
against research analysts or mutual fund management companies. Given
Spitzer's preference for global settlements,312 the latter may have been
especially unlikely. Rather, the SEC's engagement was more likely a
result of the ability of the New York Attorney General to impact any
number of aspects of financial market regulation, given the concentration
of those markets in New York.
At a minimum, then, the existence of multiple nodes of potential
interaction and influence may help to encourage more active regulatory
engagement. The presence of multiple nodes of interaction and influence
may also be important for other reasons. Most significantly, it may permit
308 See Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 348-49 (1995).
309 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2098-99.
310 See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
31 1 To related effect, a further potential precursor to an active dynamic of intersystemic regulation
may be a pattern of broad regulatory access. At the most basic level, one might think of this as an issue
of standing. Cf Schapiro, supra note 6, at 302-06 (discussing mechanisms for state vindication of
federal rights). Thus, opportunities for engagement and interaction will necessarily be limited, insofar
as individuals and entities are unable to assert their interest in issues across jurisdictional lines. This
does not mean that overlapping regulation will not occur. It may, however, be less active in character.
Ultimately, then, access may have an important impact on the density of interactions at work.
312 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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trade-offs between participating regulatory bodies.313  In such
circumstances, collective concessions need not be secured within any
single regulatory sphere, but may instead cut across distinct subject-matter
areas. 314 The potential for effective concessions-and hence agreement-
may therefore be exponentially greater. Thus, in a dialectical pattern of
engagement across jurisdictional lines, multiple avenues of influence allow
for a more productive and cooperative pattern of engagement.
Both recurrence of a given issue and multiple nodes of interaction, then,
may help to encourage interaction and permit valuable trade-offs, and
thereby further the goals of dialectical regulation. More fundamentally,
recurrence/continuity and multiple nodes of interaction are arguably the heart
of a pattern of dialectical regulation. Such a regulatory dynamic, at its most
basic level, rests on an iterative pattern of engagement among relevant
players.31 5 In slightly different terms, dialectical regulation involves a
repeat-player dynamic of sorts. 16 In such games, the incentives to cooperate
are different in kind than single-shot interactions.31 7 Because I know we will
meet again, the utility of defection-of conflict over coordination-
decreases dramatically. Regulatory coordination, in this sense, becomes
possible on account of recurrence and multiple nodes of interaction.
One might also think of the pattern of dialectical regulation, and
particularly the role of recurrence and multiple nodes of interaction, within
alternative conceptions of trust and knowledge. To begin, with repeat
interactions, one might expect the emergence of some framework of
trust.318  This has both a backward- and a forward-looking quality to it.
First, past experience may produce trust where prior interactions evince
reliability, credibility, veracity, and the like. In addition, however, the
313 See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999, 1032 (1988). By way of example, the SEC and Eliot
Spitzer engage one another not only on the regulation of research analysts, mutual funds, and insurance
companies, but on a wide array of other subjects as well. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 28, at 117.
Compromise over any single issue within their shared purview may consequently be facilitated by
simultaneous compromise on other issues as well.
314 By way of analogy, one might note the occasional insistence of participants in WTO
negotiations on broad negotiating agendas. See Geoff Winestock, EU US. Squabble Over Agenda for
WTO: Europe Wants Broad Discussions at Millennium Round, WALL ST. J. EuR., Oct. 25, 1999, at 4.
In essence, the latter permit sectoral trade-offs of the variety suggested above.
315 Cf de Bfirca, supra note 13, at 824. It is notable, in this vein, that students of the "new
governance," including particularly those writing on environmental regulation, have highlighted the
potential for greater institutionalization of non-traditional regulatory interactions. See, e.g., Karkkainen,
supra note 12, at 217-18; Scott & Holder, supra note 13, at 28-29 (discussing the European Common
Implementation Strategy, which has been developed to coordinate European Union member states'
implementation of river basin management devices).
316 See Ahdieh, supra note 22, at 2099.
317 See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 260-61 (1994).
318 Cf id. at 291 (explaining that repeat players are constrained by their own expectations of the
other party's behavior).
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expectation of future interaction may encourage reliance on that past.319
The gains from repeat plays can also be understood within a framework of
enhanced knowledge. Where the SEC and Spitzer, or the SEC and Swiss
bank regulators, the IASB, or IOSCO, have recurrent interactions, they
come to understand each other better. As such, they can coordinate their
regulatory efforts in a more effective fashion. Density of regulatory
interactions is not the only way to achieve such knowledge, but it is surely
an important way to do so.
Ultimately, one might think about patterns of dense cross-jurisdictional
interaction between regulatory institutions as grounded in a "systems
analysis" of sorts. Such analysis can be understood as follows: "To
analyze a system is to break it down into its component parts, and to
examine how those parts relate to one another and contribute to the
functioning of the whole. The emphasis in systems analysis is on
relationships rather than on the component parts themselves., 320  In this
spirit, the recurrent and potential future interactions of the SEC and Eliot
Spitzer have essentially forced the SEC to conceive of the regulation of the
New York financial markets in distinct terms. Rather than construct a
model of SEC regulation and limited state regulation, the SEC has been
forced to think instead of a common body of regulation, derived out of the
relationship of distinct regulatory entities. To similar effect is the rise of
the cross-listed multinational corporation. Such an entity operates within a
different frame of analysis than existing regulatory institutions of
relevance. Its effective regulation requires agencies with limited
jurisdictional reach to examine the component parts at work, to appreciate
their relationship, and to design mechanisms of cooperation, coordination,
and co-regulation that encompass the true system at work.32 1
E. Exiting the Dialectic
A final potential feature that can be expected to help facilitate the
emergence of dialectical regulation is the presence of some means of
"exit. '322 Is there some mechanism by which participants in the relevant
319 Cf John Fox & Melvin Guyer, "Public" Choice and Cooperation in n-Person Prisoner's
Dilemma, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 469 (1978).
320 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 487 (1997).
321 In some sense, this analysis can be seen to echo Paul Berman's cosmopolitan pluralism.
See generally Berman, Globalization, supra note 87, at 490-96. Rather than thinking of jurisdiction
within bounded lines, modem regulation requires a more comprehensive conception, in which
jurisdiction is derived from a variety of factors. Further, it must be a more fact-specific analysis,
geared to the realities of an individual's or entity's character, rather than abstract theory. Cf id. at 519.
This might be said to more effectively capture the true identities at work, in line with the initial benefit
of intersystemic regulation suggested above. By proceeding in terms of a cohesive, coherent, and
collective system of regulation, dialectical regulation may more effectively capture who or what the
subjects of regulation really are.322 See generally Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2005).
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dialectical regime can withdraw from the interaction if political,
constitutional, economic, or other pressures so demand? If, for example,
dialectical regulation demands concessions that do not merely press the
bounds of existing usages or encourage limited innovation or integration,
but instead demand radical and rapid transition, is there a way for an
agency to exit the regulatory dialectic?
Perhaps most dramatically, one might think of the capacity for
preemption by the SEC, or more definitively by federal legislation,323 as
such an escape valve in the interaction of the SEC and Eliot Spitzer. More
mildly, the United States could elect to withdraw from the MJDS if
relevant changes in Canada so demanded. Even in the enforcement of
insider trading rules, the SEC might fall back on more selective and labor-
intensive enforcement mechanisms if more comprehensive and systematic
engagement proved undesirable.
Such a capacity for exit may be important in progressive expansions in
the scope of regulatory interaction. In essence, each successive step may
be more palatable if it can-in extremis-be undone.324 Yet the potential
for exit may be even more important at the very outset, where there is little
context of interaction against which any acknowledgment, let alone
embrace, of regulatory dependence might be measured. At this early stage,
unlike in subsequent expansions of the scope of interaction, the relative
unknowns are at their high point. For this reason, institutional designs
permitting some means of exit may be especially important for the
emergence of dialectical regulation.32 5
VI. CONCLUSION
Through the 20th century, and continuing into the 21st century, the
collective mass of transnational, national, and sub-national regulation has
grown exponentially. The universe of regulators responsible for its
articulation, implementation, and enforcement has similarly expanded.
Occasions for interaction among such regulators, finally, are also
increasing, as the delineation of clear lines of jurisdiction and authority-
whether across domestic or transnational boundaries-becomes an
increasingly futile exercise. Collectively, these trends demand a better
appreciation of the nature and utility of regulatory engagement across
jurisdictional lines. Notwithstanding strongly felt inclinations toward
exclusive allocations of authority among regulatory agents, an increasingly
323 Cf Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1381-84
(2001) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's disavowal of federalist principles in preemption cases).
324 See Heifer, supra note 322, at 1643.
3125 See id at 1642. Naturally, the availability of exit also may create opportunities for abuse. This
may be the price to be paid for the heightened regulatory dependence of dialectical regulation.
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complex world may require increasingly complex regulatory regimes.326
Jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence, and the interactive
regulatory regimes that naturally follow from them, may offer a variety of
benefits, including better acknowledging the identity of regulated subjects,
overcoming regulatory inertia, encouraging innovation, and facilitating
integration. This is not to suggest the invariable utility of such patterns of
regulatory engagement. Depending on a variety of factors, distinct
regulatory relationships across jurisdictional lines might be preferable. At
least in some cases, however, circumstances will favor engaged patterns of
regulatory interaction, with benefits along the aforementioned lines.
Naturally, a fuller understanding of intersystemic regulatory
engagement will require closer attention to particular regulatory modalities
than I offer herein. Microanalysis of the various incidents and institutions
of intersystemic regulation is therefore likely to be of great importance. In
particular, the design of regulatory regimes would benefit significantly
from greater attention to the features of institutional design or extrinsic
circumstance that favor one pattern or another of cross-jurisdictional
regulatory interaction. The foregoing, however, highlights the modern
reality of some pattern of overlapping and dependent regulatory
interaction, beyond conventional, autarkic analyses of agency behavior,
and offers a potential framework for study of the nature and character of
such engagement.
Ultimately, one might imagine a version--or perhaps, given the range
of regulatory modalities at work, several versions--of a European-style
"open method of coordination" applicable in the face of meaningful
jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence. As articulated with some
degree of formalization in Europe, such a system might offer certain
flexible channels for regulatory interaction across jurisdictional lines,
advancing the potential benefits of such engagement while also protecting
against its shortcomings. While any such systematization will necessarily
require analysis well beyond the present work, the foregoing may at least
suggest the outlines of a new synthesis of interdependent regulatory
interaction across the globe today.
326 See Scott & Trubek, supra note 262, at 6-7.
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